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Abstract  
In the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand undertook a large number of tax reforms designed to 
improve the performance of the economy. Top marginal income-tax rates were reduced, a value-
added tax (GST) was introduced, a system of imputation credits for dividend income was 
implemented, and the taxation of retirement savings was reformed. As a result of these reforms, 
New Zealand now a tax system that differs in many ways from the tax systems of other OECD 
countries. Even though there is no capital gains tax, it is characterised by relatively high taxes on 
business and capital income and low taxes on labour incomes. Part of the difference occurs 
because New Zealand has very low social security taxes, and because retirement savings are taxed 
differently in New Zealand than in most OECD countries.  
This paper provides a review of the ways that the taxation of capital income in New Zealand 
may be affecting the economy. It argues that the idiosyncrasies of New Zealand’s tax structure 
favour investments in urban real estate relative to investments in other productive assets, and 
that this may be hindering productivity growth. One part of the problem is a lack of a 
comprehensive capital gains tax, while another is relatively high taxes on business and capital 
income. 
The paper discusses some of the different possible reforms that the 2018 Tax Working Group 
has identified in its Interim Report. While supportive of a capital gains tax, it argues that aspects 
of the suggested reforms are inconsistent with standard international practice and may (i) further 
distort the tax advantaged position of owner-occupied property in the economy and (ii) raise 
effective tax rates on real capital income above statutory rates. Since New Zealand already has 
some of the highest taxes on capital income in the OECD, further increases in these taxes may 
adversely affect the accumulation of capital in the economy and make it difficult for New 
Zealanders to catch up with OECD productivity levels and incomes. Although New Zealand 
could introduce a capital gains tax without worsening the distortionary effects of the tax system 
on investment patterns by adopting the standard OECD method of taxing retirement savings, 
the Interim Report appears to rule this out. Part of the difficulty is that the terms of reference for 
the Tax Working Group limit its ability to design a tax system for the future by constraining it to 
adopt many features of the tax system designed in the past. In contrast, this paper supports 
general OECD recommendations that a country may wish to reduce taxes on business income. 
For this reason, in addition to introducing a capital gains taxes and reforming retirement income 
tax policy, a full discussion of the future of New Zealand’s tax system should seriously consider 
altering the balance between capital and labour taxes by reducing income taxes, increasing taxes 
on land, and increasing social security taxes. This would bring New Zealand in line with standard 










For several decades, New Zealand has had an economy characterised by high labour 
participation rates but low capital intensity, low productivity levels, and low per capita incomes. 
A programme of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s raised income growth rates and arrested the 
decline of incomes relative to other OECD countries. However, the increase in productivity 
growth rates has not been large enough to enable New Zealand to catch up with other countries.  
Some of the 1980s and 1990s reforms involved significant changes to the tax system. Many of 
these reforms were aimed at reducing the ways taxes can alter the economic choices that people 
and firms make. Top marginal income-tax rates were reduced, a value-added tax (GST) was 
introduced, a system of imputation credits for dividend income was implemented, and the 
taxation of retirement savings was reformed. As a result of these reforms, New Zealand has a tax 
system that differs in many ways from the tax systems of other OECD countries. While many of 
the tax reforms have been successful, and have been lauded internationally, some tax distortions 
remain and some may have been exacerbated.  
By world standards, New Zealand has relatively low taxes on labour incomes (see the discussion 
in Section 2). Economic logic suggests low taxes on labour incomes should promote or at least 
not discourage labour participation and encourage people to undertake rewarding activities. 
Consistent with this logic, New Zealand has the fifth highest labour participation rate in the 
OECD, and particularly high participation rates for people aged over 55. Taxes may not be a 
particularly important determinant of participation rates, however. There is reasonable consensus 
among tax experts that income taxes have only modest effects on the labour participation 
decisions of prime-age males, although there is less consensus on the extent that taxes affect the 
participation decisions of women with children (Slemrod and Bakija 2017). New Zealand’s 
labour force participation rate is high, but it is not dissimilar to several countries with high taxes 
on labour incomes such as Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.  
 In contrast to the low taxes on labour incomes, New Zealand collects relatively large amounts of 
tax from capital incomes (also see the discussion in section 2). There is growing although not yet 
conclusive international evidence that high taxes on corporate income reduce economic growth 
rates by reducing the speed at which firms make productivity-enhancing investments to catch up 
with the leading firms in their sectors (Lee and Gordon 2005; Arnold et al 2011; Gemmell et al 
2018). Moreover, New Zealand’s taxes on capital income are unevenly applied, as some forms of 
capital income are taxed at much lower rates than other forms. The uneven way capital incomes 
are taxed may be reducing investment in sectors subject to high tax rates and encouraging 
investment in sectors subject to low tax rates. To the extent this is happening, it is liable to 
reduce economic efficiency and the overall productivity of the economy. 
Even though the ways capital-income taxes affect investment patterns and productivity levels are 
imperfectly understood, most countries are concerned that poorly designed capital income taxes 
may impose large economic costs because they divert investment flows towards sectors that are 
lightly taxed or towards foreign jurisdictions (Mankiw et al 2009). Since the 1980s most countries 
including New Zealand have reduced taxes on capital income. Indeed, many countries including 
all of the Nordic countries have chosen to tax capital incomes at lower rates than labour incomes 
out of concern that high taxes on capital incomes impose economic costs that do not justify the 
revenues they raise.  
The structure of taxes may also affect productivity levels by changing where people choose to 
live. Globally, a rising fraction of people choose to live in regions of a country that have 
relatively low productivity levels but offer desirable natural facilities rather than regions that have 




consumption and income may reduce productivity by deterring internal migration flows to the 
most productive cities and by encouraging migration to less productive cities with favourable but 
untaxed amenities (Albouy 2009). Because it alters location decisions, this mechanism is similar 
to the effect that restrictive development regulations may have on aggregate productivity (Hsieh 
and Moretti 2015; Schleicher 2017). 
In recent years the OECD has argued that the tax reforms with the greatest scope to enhance 
productivity growth concern the way capital incomes, particularly property incomes, are taxed 
(Johansson et al 2008; Brys et al 2016). For this reason, this paper primarily concerns the taxation 
of capital income and asks whether New Zealand’s productivity performance may have been 
adversely affected by the way capital income is taxed. Three issues are addressed: 
1. Does the tax system reduce productivity levels by encouraging investment in low 
productivity sectors? 
2. Does the tax system reduce productivity growth rates by discouraging investment in the most 
productive and dynamic firms within sectors?  
3. Does the tax system reduce productivity levels by deterring investment in high productivity 
regions? 
These questions are addressed sequentially. First, the paper examines the extent that New 
Zealand imposes different effective tax rates on different forms of capital income, and how this 
may encourage over-investment in lightly taxed sectors or asset classes. Much of this analysis 
concerns residential property taxation as this sector is extremely large and has particularly low tax 
rates. Secondly, the paper reviews the recent literature examining the way taxes on businesses 
may reduce the growth rate of more productive and dynamic firms. A key issue that arises when 
examining this question is whether the dynamic effects of business taxes on productivity growth 
may justify taxing capital incomes at lower rates than labour incomes. In contrast to the position 
adopted by the Tax Working Group, this paper argues that standard economic analysis provides 
no reason to tax capital and labour incomes at the same rates and several reasons not to tax these 
incomes at the same rates. Indeed, consistent with this theoretical position most OECD 
countries tax capital incomes at lower rates than labour incomes. Thirdly, the paper briefly 
considers how income and consumption taxes may encourage migration to low-productivity 
regions with desirable natural amenities. 
A major reason that this paper focuses on the taxation of capital income is that New Zealand has 
a capital-shallow economy and levels of labour productivity which are low by OECD standards. 
It is possible but by no means proven that New Zealand’s unusual tax system may be affecting 
investment and saving patterns in ways which are detrimental to productivity growth. There has 
been little research undertaken about the way that New Zealand’s tax system affects productivity 
growth rates and levels, which is surprising since New Zealand’s tax system is now quite 
different to those in many OECD countries. Indeed, in writing this paper it was striking how 
little agreement there is even over such basic issues such as whether New Zealand has high or 
low taxes on capital income, an issue that is inadequately addressed in the Tax Working Group 
Interim Report. Whatever the outcome of the Tax Working Group recommendations, it is to be 
hoped that considerably more research is undertaken about the ways New Zealand’s tax regime 
may be affecting its productivity outcomes. Currently little is understood about the incidence, 
productivity and distributional consequences of several aspects of the New Zealand tax system. 
Nor does there appear to be a work programme aimed at resolving several areas of uncertainty. 
It will be difficult to design a tax system that will enhance New Zealand’s society in the future 
unless there is a greater understanding of the ways New Zealand’s unusual tax system affects 




2. Tax neutrality, allocative efficiency, and the taxation of capital income 
New Zealand’s tax structure  
New Zealand has a very different tax structure from most OECD countries. While some of the 
differences occur because New Zealand has a very low top marginal tax rate, most occur because 
New Zealand raises an extremely low share of taxes from social security taxes. In most OECD 
countries, social security taxes are levied on labour incomes but not capital incomes and thus 
labour incomes are taxed at higher rates than capital incomes. In 2016, New Zealand raised 
about 1.1% of GDP in social security taxes (the ACC levy). The average OECD country raised 
9% of GDP in social security taxes, primarily to pay pensions (see Tables 1 and 2). New Zealand 
does not have dedicated social security taxes partly because pensions are unrelated to the size of 
the tax payments a person makes.1   
Taxes on labour incomes  
Since New Zealand does not raise much tax from social security taxes applied to labour income, 
more revenue needs to be raised through taxes that are applied to both capital and labour 
income including business taxes. The difference is large. New Zealand raises 17.5% of GDP in 
income taxes whereas the average OECD country raises only 11.5%. Because capital income is 
only subject to income tax but labour income is subject to income tax and Social Security taxes, 
labour income is taxed at considerably higher rates than capital income in most OECD 
countries. As a consequence, New Zealand raises a larger fraction of its tax revenues from capital 
income and corporate taxes than other countries (see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1). If income taxes 
and business taxes are more distortionary than labour taxes, as international evidence suggests, 
New Zealand’s decision to fund pensions out of general taxation rather than social security taxes 
may be reducing productivity levels and economic growth rates.  
As New Zealand does not use social security taxes to fund government retirement incomes, New 
Zealand has very low taxes on labour incomes by OECD standards. The OECD reports that 
while a New Zealand worker earning the average wage faces the 10th highest income taxes in the 
OECD, the combined income and social security taxes they pay are the second lowest in the 
OECD (see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1).2 For people earning 167% of average income, the 
respective figures are 13th highest and 3rd lowest. The labour share of taxes is also low because 
New Zealand’s top marginal tax rate is only 33%, payable on incomes over $70,000. In contrast, 
the top marginal tax rates in Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom are 45%, although 
these top rates apply at much higher thresholds. The top marginal tax rate in the United States is 
39.6%. 
  
                                                          
1 In most OECD countries a person receives a pension that depends on the tax contributions they make during their 
working lives. One other OECD country, Ireland, provides a pension unrelated to the size of tax payments or 
contributions to a compulsory saving schemes. However, Ireland has social security taxes applied to labour but not 
capital incomes. 
2
 OECD Tax Policy Database Table I5. https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I5  The OECD 
calculates the average personal income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income for 




Table 1: New Zealand’s tax revenues in 2016 
 Tax take % GDP 
Income tax               $31.6 billion                    12.5% 
Corporate tax               $11.1 billion                    4.4% 
Interest and Dividends               $2.3 billion                    0.9% 
GST               $18.2 billion                    7.2% 
Other indirect               $6.5 billion                    2.8% 
ACC levies               $2.8 billion                    1.1% 
Total               $74.3 billion                    29.4% 
Source: New Zealand Government (2016). Author’s calculations 
 
Table 2: Tax collection by country - 2015/ 2016 
 US UK Germany OECD 
Average 
NZ 
Income Tax 12.0% 11.7% 11.3% 11.5% 17.8% 
-Personal 9.9% 9.1% 9.5% 8.8% 13.4% 
-Corporate 2.2% 2.5% 1.8% 2.9% 4.4% 
      
Consumption Taxes 3.7% 10.4% 9.8% 10.7% 10.0% 
      
Social Security Taxes 6.1% 6.2% 13.9% 9.1% 1.1% 
      
Total 25.4% 32.9% 36.5% 34.2% 29.4% 
Source: Slemrod and Bakija (2017 p 16) plus New Zealand Government (2016). Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Taxes on capital incomes 
There are many ways to measure taxes on businesses and on capital income, and it is possible to 
argue that New Zealand has very high or very low taxes on business income depending on the 
measures that are used. It is useful to classify these measures three ways: the total amount of 
revenue raised from capital income taxes; the tax rates applied to businesses; and the tax rates 
applied to the income paid by businesses to their equity and debt claimants. 
In the 1980s, New Zealand aligned the corporate tax rate with the maximum income tax rate and 
reduced the rate to 33 percent. At the time this rate was low relative to the rates in many OECD 
countries. No longer. New Zealand now has the ninth highest corporate statutory tax rate in the 
OECD. However, the effective tax rate may be even higher as by some measures New Zealand 
has the highest effective corporate tax collection as a fraction of the total tax collection in the 
OECD. For example, according to the OECD, taxes collected on the income, profits and capital 
gains of corporates were a higher fraction of GDP in New Zealand than any other OECD 
country in 2015 (see Table A1.2 in Appendix 1).3  
 
New Zealand’s effective capital income tax rates may be high because of the way various 
deductions are made. There are two separate international comparisons of how this affects 
                                                          
3 See the OECD website https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV Category 1200 - Taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains of corporates. These data were reported by the Tax Working Group in their paper “The 




effective tax rates. Price Waterhouse, in conjunction with the World Bank, calculate the tax owed 
on a standardised medium size company taking into account depreciation and all adjustments.  If 
social security payments and other labour taxes paid by firms are excluded, because their 
incidence falls on labour, in 2016 New Zealand had the highest effective tax rates in the OECD 
in the first two years of a company’s life in 2016.4 The second international comparison is by the 
OECD which has recently tried to calculate forward looking tax rates taking into account 
deductions and allowances for a firm financed by debt and by equity, for several different types 
of investments, in environments that differ in terms of inflation and interest rates (Hanappi 
2018). By this measure, New Zealand also has moderate to high effective tax rates – many of 
these numbers suggest New Zealand’s effective tax rates are in the upper third and often the 
upper quarter of business taxes in the OECD (see table A1.3 in Appendix 1). For example, in a 
relatively high interest rate, high inflation environment (real interest rates = 5%, inflation = 2%) 
New Zealand had the 9th highest effective marginal tax rate for equity financed investments out 
of 36 OECD countries. (It was the 6th highest among the 20 OECD countries with incomes at 
least as high as New Zealand, and 3rd largest amongst the 21 small OECD countries). It had the 
highest effective taxes on investments in research and development amongst rich or small 
OECD countries, and the 4th highest out of all 36 OECD countries. Collectively, these numbers 
all suggest businesses in New Zealand are taxed at relatively high rates. 
 
There is one published measure that suggests New Zealand has relatively low tax rates on capital 
income. This is the tax rate after imputation on dividend income paid to high income domestic 
shareholders, a measure mention in the Tax Working Group interim report: for example, they 
write (page 16)  
“New Zealand’s company rate is above average, and company tax revenue to GDP is high. After imputation, 
however, New Zealand’s tax rate on domestic shareholders is the sixth lowest in the OECD. New Zealand is 
more reliant on company tax revenue than most other countries.”  
Unfortunately, this measure provides a misleading perspective of New Zealand’s taxes on capital 
incomes. It is misleading because the calculation refers to the amount of tax paid by a person in 
an OECD country on the top marginal tax rate who pays income tax on dividend income in the 
same year it is earned; that is, it refers to the tax paid by extremely high income earners who do 
not hold their assets in a retirement scheme taxed on an expenditure basis. This measure is not 
comparing the tax paid by a New Zealander earning $NZ100,000 with a citizen of the United 
States or the United Kingdom earning the equivalent of $NZ100,000, for the latter people are 
not being taxed at the top marginal tax rate and they are likely to hold their assets in a retirement 
saving account that is not subject to further taxation until money is withdrawn. Rather, it is 
comparing the tax paid by extremely wealthy people in each country. While the Tax Working 
Group focuses on this measure – possibly because they believe it is important that high-income 
New Zealanders should pay relatively low taxes on their dividend income as well as their labour 
income – it does not mean that New Zealanders earning normal incomes pay low taxes on 
capital incomes by international standards.5 There is no evidence they do. Rather, by most other 
                                                          
4  See  https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes-2016/paying-taxes-2016.pdf. In 2004 New Zealand was rated 
third highest (Djankov et al 2010). When social security payments are included in the taxes paid by businesses, New 
Zealand falls to 23/35 further suggesting that New Zealand has very high taxes on corporate income because it does 
not have social security taxes. The summary data are presented in Table A1.3 in Appendix 1. 
5 There are three reasons why this measure should not be taken to indicate that ordinary New Zealanders pay much 
lower taxes on capital income than people in other countries. First, New Zealand has much lower top marginal 
income tax rates than other countries, but marginal income tax rates for other incomes are not particularly low. For 
example, the marginal tax rate on a person earning $NZ90,000 in New Zealand is 33%; an Australian earning 
$A90,000 has a marginal tax rate of 32.5% (not 45%, their top marginal rate); a citizen of the United Kingdom 




measures taxes on capital incomes capital are actually rather high, even though New Zealand 
does not tax capital gains.  
The key question concerns the ways taxes affect economic decision-making, for taxes on capital 
incomes affect the way firms and people make investment and saving decisions, and the way 
incomes are determined and distributed. Most international tax experts focus on the effective 
marginal tax rates paid by businesses, for this affects investment decisions by firms considering 
different investment opportunities within a country, or effective average tax rates, as this affects 
decisions whether to invest in one country or another. By these measures – except the tax paid 
by extremely high income people on dividends not held in retirement income accounts - New 
Zealand has relatively high taxes on capital income. Since it is not obviously true that the after-
imputation tax rate on the dividend income received by very high income people is a more 
important determinant of the way investment decisions are made by firms than, say, the tax rate 
applying to overseas investors or the effective tax rates levied on small firms, it appears 
reasonable to categorize New Zealand has having some of the highest taxes on capital income in 
the OECD.   
Optimal tax systems  
The key factors for a government when it chooses a set of taxes are the extent that people and 
firms change their behaviour in response to particular taxes, how the incidence of these taxes 
affects the distribution of resources, and the administrative complexity of the taxes. A tax system 
is neutral if it does not distort the decisions people make. As neutrality is only one goal of a tax 
system, different classes of income do not have to be taxed equally and it is appropriate for a 
government to choose taxes that distort economic behaviour if it believes this will help achieve 
some of its equity objectives. Similarly, it may reject taxes that are neutral if it believes these are 
unfair.6  
An efficient tax system can have different tax rates on different activities. If people do not 
change their behaviour in response to a particular tax, it will not be very distortionary to impose 
that tax at a high rate. If people make large, undesirable changes to their behaviour in response 
to a particular tax, it may be appropriate to have those taxes imposed at low or zero rates. 
However, a tax system should avoid uneven taxes on capital incomes if investment decisions are 
very responsive to any differences in the taxes on different forms of capital income or it is 
administratively difficult to tax different activities at different rates.  
New Zealand’s high effective corporate tax rates relative to other OECD countries reflects some 
fundamental structural features of its tax system. Unlike most OECD countries, New Zealand 
attempts to tax corporate incomes, labour incomes and capital incomes at similar rates, although 
corporate tax rates are slightly lower than either of the other rates.  New Zealand’s choice, which 
is affirmed in the Interim Report of the Tax Working Group at several places, reflects three 
long-standing positions:  
 it is inequitable to tax capital and labour incomes at different rates;  
 it is often impractical to tax labour and capital incomes at different rates; and 
                                                          
25%; and a German earning €55,000 pays 42%. Secondly, in most OECD countries (except Australia) the dividend 
payment is likely to be held in a retirement saving account that is not subject to additional taxation. New Zealand’s 
imputation system provides much less tax advantage in these circumstances, but this factor is ignored in the 
comparison. Lastly, New Zealand high income earners have a much smaller advantage when it comes to interest 
income – they ranked 11th out of 33 , not 27th out of 33, by this measure. (See Harding and Marten 2018).  
6 For example, the poll tax that was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1989 was neutral, but it was widely 




 it is inefficient to tax capital income at low rates as other taxes must be raised to offset the 
revenue loss, and these taxes entail efficiency losses that increase more than proportionately 
with the size of the tax. 
These positions have been easy to articulate and were encapsulated in the “Broad-base low-rate” 
mantra of the 1980s. Why should a labourer earning $35,000 pay more tax than a someone 
receiving $35,000 in interest and dividend income? If capital incomes were taxed at lower rates 
than labour income, would it not provide a small business-person with an incentive to classify 
most of the income from their business as capital income rather than labour income? And surely 
the efficiency costs from raising labour income taxes must be worse the efficiency gains from 
reducing capital income taxes? 
The philosophy of taxing capital and labour incomes at the same rates has been a central 
component of New Zealand’s tax system since the 1980s. While this philosophy sounds sensible 
to many, it needs to be emphasised that it has very little theoretical basis, it is not standard 
OECD practice, is not consistent with the widely praised and progressive tax systems of the 
Nordic countries, and, given the way New Zealand taxes residential property income, it is not 
even applied consistently in New Zealand. It is perhaps surprising that the Tax Working Group 
has uncritically adopted a position so at odds with standard theory and practice.  There is, of 
course, nothing inherently wrong with New Zealand adopting a tax system different from the 
rest of the OECD. However, if New Zealand wishes to adopt a tax system quite different from 
that of the rest of the world, and suggest reforms that accentuate these differences further, it 
would be useful to ensure a programme of research is undertaken to ensure that the tax system is 
not harming the performance of the economy. Unfortunately, recent research suggests that the 
cost in terms of productivity and economic growth rates of having very high taxes on capital 
income may be higher than was understood when many of the reforms were undertaken in the 
1980s (see section 4).  
The statement that taxes on labour, capital, and business incomes need not be the same may 
sound foreign to many New Zealand ears. However, since Mirrlees (1971) almost all theoretic 
work in the tax literature argues that capital income and labour income need not be taxed at the 
same rates (for recent discussions see Mankiw et al 2009;  Mirrlees et al 2010; Mirrlees et al 2011;  
Diamond and Saez 2011; Auerbach 2012; and, in an Australian and New Zealand context, 
Diamond 2011). Thirty years ago, following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Judd (1985), and 
Chamley (1986) a much stronger view was popular, that it was optimal to have a zero tax rate on 
capital incomes. While the theoretical literature has largely moved away from this position, there 
is no theoretical basis for taxing capital and labour at the same rates.7 
The key issue concerns an equity-efficiency trade-off. Capital income taxes tend to be more 
distortionary than labour income taxes, which suggests capital income should be taxed at lower 
rates.8 However, capital incomes tend to be higher for those with more income and wealth, 
which provides an ‘equity’ motivation to tax capital incomes at a higher rate than labour 
incomes. The balance depends on how much a government wants to reduce economic 
distortions and enhance income levels and growth rates, and how much it favours redistribution. 
The answer may change over time. If income inequality increases due to an increase in the size of 
capital incomes, for example, a society may wish to increase the taxes on capital incomes for 
                                                          
7 There is still some debate as to whether or not it is optimal to tax capital income at all: for example, consider the 
contrasting positions of Mankiw et al (2009) and Diamond and Saez (2012). Nonetheless, most experts now appear 
to believe that while there is no good reason to tax capital and labour incomes at the same rate, the optimal tax rate 
for capital incomes is not zero. 
8 See Slemrod and Bakija (2017) for an extensive discussion on the relative size of the distortionary effects of taxes 




equity reasons. If the capital share of output gets very large in the future, and these incomes are 
earned by a small number of people, governments may want to tax capital more than labour. 
Nonetheless, whatever solution a society favours, there is no inherent reason to tax capital 
income and labour income at the same rates. If a country wishes to enhance growth rates by 
taxing capital incomes, including business incomes, at lower rates than labour incomes, it can 
make this choice. 
New Zealand is unusual because it tries to tax capital and labour incomes at the same rate. Most 
OECD countries do not, choosing to tax labour incomes at higher rates than capital incomes. 
The difference largely occurs because New Zealand raises an extremely low share of taxes from 
social security taxes. As indicated above, social security taxes in most OECD countries are levied 
on labour incomes but not capital incomes and thus labour incomes are taxed at higher rates 
than capital incomes.  
While social security taxes allow most OECD countries to tax capital incomes at lower rates than 
labour incomes, the four Scandinavian countries have adopted a different approach, the Nordic 
Dual Tax model. This tax system, introduced by Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland in the 
1990s, deliberately taxes capital incomes at a lower rate than labour incomes in order to minimise 
the distortionary effects of taxes. In the basic version of the model, capital incomes are taxed at a 
minimum flat rate and labour incomes are taxed at graduated rates that are at least as high. This 
tax system stems from a belief that the distortionary effects of capital income taxes are much 
worse than the distortionary effects of labour income taxes. This model is garnering considerable 
praise. As Slemrod and Bakija (2017) write:  
If the VAT is the world’s tax success story of the past half century, then a contender for the success 
story of the next fifty years is a Scandinavian innovation known as the dual income tax. ….The 
argument for the DIT, which is especially relevant for small open economies like the Scandinavian 
countries, is that a low capital income tax rate would lessen the incentive for domestic wealth owners to 
invest capital outside the country and to invest in hard to measure types of capital that aren’t include in 
the tax base…..it may come as a shock that the Nordic countries, with a reputation for highly 
progressive tax and other policies would abandon a graduated tax schedule for capital income. 
Apparently, they believe that a highly progressive tax on at least some forms of capital income is an 
inefficient means of redistributing income. compared to a progressive labour income tax.  
These four countries are all considered progressive and all have much lower income inequality 
than New Zealand - and yet all have decided to tax labour incomes at higher rates than capital 
incomes. Most have labour participation rates similar to those in New Zealand. All four 
countries have adopted means to ensure that small-business owners do not try to shield their 
labour income from tax by reclassifying it as capital income. This suggest that it is not necessary 
to tax capital incomes at high rates to achieve progressive income distribution goals.  
The taxation of capital income  
For the last thirty years, a key goal of New Zealand’s tax policy has been to avoid taxes that 
provide artificial incentives to invest in one class of assets rather than another.9  When different 
activities are taxed at different rates, people and firms have incentives to invest more in lightly 
                                                          
9 For example, this theme is a focus of the following reports: “The tax treatment of superannuation” (1988);  
“Consultative document on the taxation of income from capital” (1989), “The taxation of income from capital - an 
overview” (1989), and “Final report of the consultative committee on the taxation of income from capital” (1992); 
“Private Provision for Retirement: The Issues” (1991) and “Private Provision for Retirement: The Options” (1992) 
(The Todd Task Force on Private Provision for Retirement);  “Tax Review 2001 – Final Paper” (The McLeod 
Review, 2001); and “A Tax System for New Zealand’s future” (2010) (Victoria University of Wellington Tax 




taxed activities and to invest less in heavily taxed activities. To the extent people respond to these 
incentives, we can expect to see an economy that over-invests in lightly taxed asset classes that 
have a low pre-tax yield and under-invests in highly taxed asset classes that have a high pre-tax 
yield.  
New Zealand does not tax all capital income equally. There are a variety of exceptions. 
1. The imputed rent associated with owner-occupied housing is taxed at low rates. 
2. Capital gains are not systematically taxed. This means there are different effective tax rates on 
investments generating cash incomes at different time horizons, with short-horizon 
investments taxed at higher effective rates than long-horizon investments.  
3. When there is inflation, real interest earnings are taxed at above normal rates, because the 
inflation component of interest income is taxed. Conversely, investors who borrow are 
allowed to deduct the inflation component of interest payments from taxable income, 
artificially reducing their tax rates.  
4. There are a variety of rules governing collective investment vehicles such as Portfolio 
Investment Entities (PIES) or KiwiSaver funds that result in income from assets held in 
different accounts being taxed in different ways. 
5. There is different tax treatment of tangible investments and some classes of non-tangible 
investments (such as marketing expenses) because of the rules governing the deductibility of 
capital investments.  
6. Nominal interest payments made to foreign entities are (in general) taxed by the New 
Zealand Government at lower rates than nominal interest payments paid to residents.  
Most of these examples have been thoroughly discussed in the various investigations of the tax 
system that have taken place since 1985. Collectively they mean that income from residential 
property, New Zealand’s largest asset class, is taxed at lower rates than income from other assets.  
There are many reasons why different types of capital income are taxed at different rates. 
Governments may wish to alter the distribution of income or wealth by taxing some sources of 
capital income at low rates. Some sources of capital income may be administratively difficult to 
tax. And some of the reasons are philosophical, reflecting debates about the extent that income 
should be taxed when it is earned (income taxes) or taxed when it is spent (expenditure taxes). 
Most countries attempt to tax some types of capital income on an income basis, and other types 
of capital income on an expenditure basis, and this inconsistency is one of the factors that causes 
capital income to be taxed unevenly.  
New Zealand’s tax regime embodies this inconsistency. New Zealand has an indirect expenditure 
tax, the Goods and Services tax (GST), but largely levies direct taxes on an income basis. There 
are exceptions to this rule, however. For example, income from owner-occupied housing is taxed 
on an expenditure basis and income in the form of capital gains are generally exempt from tax. 
Other countries make different choices. Many countries choose to tax owner-occupied housing 
and funds placed in specialised retirement-savings accounts on an expenditure basis, but tax 
other classes of income including capital gains on an income basis. Each system creates its own 
inefficiencies and distortions. A key question for New Zealand is whether the distortions and 
inefficiencies in our system could be reduced by altering the way different types of capital 




There are two basic approaches to reform the way capital income is taxed in New Zealand. The 
first approach is to tax income on an income basis but to impose taxes more consistently so that 
capital incomes are taxed more evenly. If this approach were taken, the key issues concern the 
taxation of income from owner-occupied housing, the taxation of capital gains, and the taxation 
of real interest income. If New Zealand were to follow this path, taxes on incomes from owner-
occupied housing and capital gains should be increased until they equal the tax rates on other 
assets, but taxes on the income from interest-earning assets should be reduced.  
The second approach would be to increase the types of capital income that are taxed on an 
expenditure basis. The most common way to do this around the world is to tax income placed in 
a retirement-savings fund on an expenditure basis, but more radical options such as the Hall-
Rabushka (1985) flat tax or the Bradford (1986) X-tax are possible. If New Zealand were to 
follow this path, it would mean reducing taxes on the income from some classes of assets such as 
retirement savings until they were more in line with the taxes on owner-occupied housing.  
Either of these approaches is possible. In practice, however, neither approach is likely to be 
consistently implemented, so different classes of income will still be taxed differently. This 
means some economic distortions and inefficiencies will remain. Moreover, the community and 
political support necessary to ensure reforms are long lasting might be easier for one approach 
than the other. In these circumstances the overall costs and benefits of each package of reforms 
can be evaluated using a comparative institutions perspective. In adopting this perspective, it 
should be noted that some of the measures necessary to equalise the taxation of different types 
of capital income on an income basis are explicitly ruled out by the Tax Working Group’s Terms 
of Reference. This may make it difficult to obtain the results that would be achieved if a broader 
set of reforms were implemented.   
Since Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b), the effects of potential tax 
reforms have been examined by considering a trade-off between economic efficiency and the 
distribution of income or wealth. This “optimal taxation” approach requires an analysis of the 
ways taxes alter economic behaviour and prices, the way that price changes may shift the 
incidence of the tax from those who make the tax payment to other parties, and way society 
values the welfare of the parties affected by the taxes. This analysis is difficult to do as the 
incidence of taxes can be shifted in complex ways, and there is considerable uncertainty as to the 
size of these effects. Even though there is relatively little empirical evidence about some of these 
factors, it is important that they are not ignored.  
The successive reviews of New Zealand’s tax system that have been undertaken since 1985 have 
discussed the trade-off between the efficiency and equity objectives of different tax reforms at 
some length. These reviews have consistently argued that a tax regime should not provide 
artificial tax incentives to invest in one class of assets rather than another, but exceptions have 
been made for residential property which is lightly taxed because neither imputed rent nor capital 
gains are taxed. Given the thoroughness of these reviews, are there reasons to revisit the 
arguments? There may be. To date, New Zealand’s governing bodies have thought the 
distributional disadvantages of increasing taxes on residential property owners outweighed the 
productivity benefits. They may be wrong. Since the last tax review, advances in modelling 
techniques and new international empirical evidence have provided additional insights into the 
way the incidence of taxes on residential property incomes affect economic outcomes. 
The biggest shift in the literature concerns the analysis of the way that income and wealth are 
redistributed when taxes are capitalised into residential property prices. Many of New Zealand’s 
earlier tax reviews assumed that residential property prices would be little affected by the tax 




and equity objectives.10 There is now greater support for Ricardo’s (1817) contention that 
distortionary taxes are often capitalised into property prices, which changes the incidence of the 
taxes dramatically (for a recent review, see Hilber, 2017).  If property prices are highly responsive 
to the tax system, the equity and efficiency implications of different tax policies could be very 
different from those suggested by previous enquiries into the tax system.  
Tax neutrality and income taxes  
What would a tax system look like if all income were taxed on an income basis? The standard 
definition for income is the Haig-Simon definition11:  
 Income = consumption plus change in wealth.  
This definition of income includes: 
 labour income; 
 capital income adjusted for the loss of value of assets, including corporate income, interest, 
and dividends; 
 the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing; and 
 capital gains, which should be taxed on an accruals basis. 
Table 3 shows how different classes of capital income would be taxed under a neutral income tax 
system, and contrasts this with the way capital income is actually taxed in New Zealand.  Under a 
neutral income tax system, real (inflation-adjusted) capital gains would be taxed wherever they 
occur, be it owner-occupied housing, rental housing, retirement savings accounts, or other asset 
classes. The imputed rent that people obtain from living in their own homes, adjusted for real 
depreciation, real interest payments, and other charges would also be taxed. Finally, real interest 
earnings, but not the inflation component of interest earnings would be taxed, and real interest 
payments but not the inflation component of interest payments would be deductible from tax.12   
The table shows capital income is not taxed evenly in New Zealand. The three biggest 
differences are  
 imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is not taxed; 
 real capital gains are not generally taxed; 
 nominal interest earnings rather than real interest earnings are taxed, and firms deduct 
nominal interest not real interest payments to calculate their taxable income.  
 
 
                                                          
10 An exception is the 2009/10 Tax Working Group. In its final report it acknowledges that a land tax might lower 
property values, but it restricts its equity analysis to a discussion of the effects of lower prices on current land-
owners. 
11 While standard, this definition is not free from controversy. One difficulty with this definition is that income 
defined in this manner can exceed production. For instance, if a decline in interest rates leads to an increase in the 
present value of assets, positive capital gains can result even though there is no increase in the current or future 
value of production. For a contemporary discussion of some of the issues surrounding the Haig-Simon definition, 
see Slemrod and Bakija (2017). 
12 If nominal interest earnings or nominal capital gains were taxed, real incomes would be taxed at higher-than 




Table 3: The taxation of different classes of capital income  
Owner-occupied 
housing 





Nominal value of private wealth in March 2016 ($million) 
(total gross wealth = $1,495,335m; total net wealth = $1,309,229m) 
$677,035 $228,329 $69,136 $349,658 $159,381 
Neutral tax system 
-Tax imputed rent net 
of real depreciation and 
real interest payments 
and other related 
charges. 
-Tax rent net of real 
depreciation and real 
interest payments and 
other related charges. 
 
-Tax dividend income 
and other earnings. 
-Tax dividend income 
and other earnings net 
of real depreciation and 
real interest payments. 
 
-Tax real capital gains 
and losses. 
-Tax real capital gains 
and losses. 
-Tax real interest 
earnings.  
-Tax real capital gains 
and losses. 
-Tax real interest 
earnings. 
  -Tax real capital gains 
and losses. 
 -Tax real capital gains 
and losses. 
     
Current New Zealand tax system 
-No tax on imputed 
rent, and no 
deductions. 
Rents net of nominal 
interest payments and 
other related charges 
are taxed. 
Dividend income and 
other earnings are 
taxed. 
-Dividend income and 
other earnings net of 
nominal depreciation 
and real interest 
payments taxed. 
 
  -Nominal interest 
earnings are taxed. 
 -Nominal interest 
earnings are taxed. 
-No capital gains taxes. -Capital gains not 
usually taxed, except in 
specific cases. 
-Capital gains not 
usually taxed, except in 
specific cases. 
-Capital gains not 
usually taxed, except in 
specific cases. 
 
  Maximum tax rate 














Other differences exist. For example, income earned in some unit trusts and superannuation 
schemes are taxed at a maximum rate of 28% rather than the usual maximum rate of 33%.13   
The taxation of residential property income 
The taxation of residential property income is the most important capital-income issue, for three 
reasons. First, residential property is the single biggest asset class in New Zealand. Secondly, 
income from property income is lightly taxed. Thirdly, the way the tax regime is capitalised into 
property prices is likely to be a key determinant of inequality as this determines the extent that 
the incidence of the tax is shifted from those who pay the tax to other parties.  
Residential property is the largest class of assets in New Zealand. In 2016 the value of owner-
occupied housing was $677 billion, financed by $154 billion debt claims and $523 billion residual 
equity. This was 52 percent of net household wealth, and 46 percent of gross private assets in 
New Zealand.  There was an additional $228 billion in leased residential real estate, financed by 
$62 billion debt. In total, residential property assets comprised 69 percent of net household 
wealth, and 61 percent of gross private assets. Holdings of interest earning securities by New 
Zealand residents were only $159 billion, assets in retirement savings accounts were $69 billion 
and net business assets (excluding investments in residential property) were $350 billion. New 
Zealand’s balance sheet, and the various ways the size of the real estate sector can be measured, 
are discussed in Appendix 2.  
The extent that property income is taxed less (or more) than other assets depends on the other 
assets being considered. The most commonly held classes of assets in New Zealand are directly 
held interest-earning securities such as bank accounts, and interest-earning and equity securities 
held in KiwiSaver and other retirement income accounts.14 Because most people hold these 
assets, they are the natural benchmarks with which to compare the taxation of other asset 
classes.15  
In Appendix 3, the tax regimes for income from owner-occupied and leased residential property 
and other commonly held assets are compared. In all but two of the comparisons the income 
from residential property is taxed less than income from the other assets. The biggest tax 
advantage is obtained by debt-free owner-occupied residential property relative to interest-
earning securities, as neither imputed rent or capital gains are taxed but the inflation component 
of nominal interest earnings is taxed. The two exceptions concern rental property which is taxed 
in a similar manner to equities held in KiwiSaver accounts, but less than income from interest 
earning assets.  
When property is under-taxed relative to other classes of capital income, households and 
property investors have an incentive to invest too much in residential property. This has two 
effects. First, owner-occupied households may choose to live in larger or better-quality houses 
than otherwise, rather than investing in other income-generating assets. Secondly, the price of 
land may be driven up. The extent that land prices increase depends on the extent that land is 
supplied elastically or inelastically and the size of the tax advantage to the marginal purchasers of 
land (Hilber 2017). The elasticity of land supply depends on a variety of factors including the 
availability of land suitable for residential construction, the ease with which land can be 
converted from one use to another, the regulations governing construction, and the speed and 
                                                          
13 The statutory income tax rate for a person earning more than $70,000 is 33 percent. New Zealanders have the 
option of investing in Portfolio Investment Entities (PIES). These are managed trusts that collect funds from 
multiple investors and invest these funds. The maximum tax rate on a PIE is only 28 percent, and people on lower 
marginal tax rates who invest in PIES pay tax at their marginal tax rate. 
14 In 2017 more than 2,700,000 people had KiwiSaver accounts. Annual contributions exceed $5 billion dollars. 
15 While these assets are held by most people, in total they only account for 25-30 percent of the economy’s non-




cost of transport. When the supply of land responds only slowly to increases in demand, and 
people expect demand to increase, the absence of a capital gains tax makes the speculative 
purchase of property particularly attractive. 
If the price of property is artificially increased when property income is taxed at lower rates than 
the income from other assets, the tax system causes an intergenerational wealth transfer. The 
first generation of property owners benefits because they can sell their land at artificially high 
prices to the next generation. All subsequent generations lose because they have to pay higher 
rents or higher prices to purchase property (Feldstein 1977). This intergenerational transfer has 
both welfare consequences and macroeconomic consequences that arise because of the changes 
in the distribution of wealth. Since these effects occur as a result of changes in house prices they 
are sometimes ignored in welfare analyses of the tax system.  
Various authors have developed theoretical models to assess the macroeconomic and welfare 
consequences of taxing property income less than the income from other assets when the supply 
of housing is not perfectly elastic.16 These papers develop the argument that land  prices are 
likely to be artificially high if land is lightly taxed relative to other asset classes, inducing an 
intergenerational transfer that adversely affects young and future generations. Some of the 
adverse effects can be offset if the older generations bequeath their property to younger 
generations. Even in this case, however, there can be adverse welfare consequences as young 
households may be forced to delay homeownership or the purchase of a large house until they 
inherit – and some people will not inherit at all.   
One consequence of artificially high land prices may be a low aggregate capital stock. If the 
generation benefiting from high property prices increases its consumption spending, there will be 
a decline in savings and a reduction in the ownership of non-residential property assets by 
subsequent generations. If the reduction is not offset by an increase in foreign investment, there 
will be a reduction in the amount of non-residential capital in the economy. Following the work 
of Feldstein-Horioka (1981), most international studies suggest that foreign investment is not a 
perfect substitute for domestic investment, so artificially high land prices reduce other forms of 
investment in the economy. There is no definitive evidence that such a reduction has occurred in 
New Zealand, but most evidence suggests New Zealand has low levels of non-residential capital 
by OECD standards.17 Given the link between capital investment and productivity, 
understanding whether low levels of capital are a result of the way residential property is taxed 
relative to other assets should be a priority for future research.18  
Some features of New Zealand’s recent economic performance are consistent with the ideas that 
(i) tax rules may be capitalised into property prices and (ii) the tax system may direct investment 
towards relatively lightly taxed areas. By some measures New Zealand has had the fastest 
increase in residential property prices of any OECD country since 1990, when the tax advantages 
                                                          
16 Key papers include Feldstein (1977), Calvo, Kotlikoff and Rodriguez (1979), Fane (1984), Chamley and Wright 
(1987), Skinner (1996), Batina and Ihori (2000), Gervais (2002), Petrucci (2006), and Hilber (2017). 
17 See the discussion in Appendix 2. 
18 One of the reasons why it is difficult to obtain clear evidence about the economic effects of uneven capital 
income taxes is that the size of the effect depends on a variety of factors, not just the tax rate, and these factors 
change through time. For example, the tax advantage of investments in residential property relative to interest-
earning securities depends on the inflation rate, real interest rates, and the expected rate of property price inflation, 
all of which have changed substantially since 1990. As each of these other factors changed over time, the size of the 
tax advantage changed over time. Since factors such as people’s expectations about property price growth are poorly 
measured, the size of the tax advantage enjoyed by residential property is uncertain and so it becomes difficult to 




of property relative to some other classes of assets were increased.19 Moreover, New Zealand has 
relatively low levels of investment in business assets for a country with its population growth 
(Conway 2018), and the ratio of non-property business assets to GDP declined between 2000 
and 2017 even though the ratio of residential property assets to GDP nearly doubled (see 
Appendix 2). Neither the steep increase in property prices nor the small amount of investment in 
business assets may be related to the tax system. But if investors over-invest in lightly taxed asset 
classes and under-invest in highly taxed asset classes, New Zealand’s tax system may be behind 
some of the extraordinary large increases in property prices seen since 1990. If that is true, New 
Zealand’s tax system will have adversely affected the welfare of poorer and younger households 
in ways that have largely been ignored.  
3. Possible tax reforms when capital incomes are taxed on an income tax 
basis  
This section considers the different ways the 2018/2019 Tax Working Group could reform the 
way capital incomes are taxed. The Terms of Reference of the Tax Working Group rule out 
taxing the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing, taxing capital gains on owner-occupied 
housing, or imposing land taxes on owner-occupied housing.  These restrictions clearly prevent 
taxes from being equalised across asset classes by increasing taxes on owner-occupied property. 
Some reforms are still possible, since the distortionary effects of the tax system depend on the 
way different classes of income are taxed relative to each other, not just the way each class of 
asset is taxed. If taxes on property income cannot be increased, the tax on other classes of assets 
can be reduced. For this reason, the Tax Working Group could consider changing the way that 
interest income is taxed and the way that retirement-savings accounts such as KiwiSaver 
accounts are taxed as an alternative to considering the way that taxes on property income can be 
raised.  
Most tax reform options have been discussed in detail previously – by the 1988 Brash 
Committee investigating the taxation of superannuation, the 1989 Review of the Taxation of 
Capital Income, the 1992 Todd Task Force on Private Provision for Retirement, the 2001 
McLeod Review, the 2009 Tax Working Group and the 2010 Saving Working Group. These 
reforms have also been discussed at length by the OECD (Johansson et al 2008; Brys et al 2016). 
Many of these reviews agreed that there was a logical case for introducing a capital gains tax, for 
introducing a land tax, or for changing the way inflation is treated in the tax system, but they 
further argued that change is politically difficult or administratively costly. Most but not all 
argued against an expenditure-tax treatment of retirement savings. So why should the 
recommendations of the 2018/2019 Tax Working Group be different?  
There are two reasons, one analytic and one welfare-related. The new analytic issue is the extent 
that asset prices, particularly property prices, respond to differences in the taxation of different 
asset classes. In the last two decades the theoretical models analysing the effects of tax on 
residential property markets have become much more sophisticated and have been able to 
analyse how the incidence of difference taxes depends on the supply and demand elasticities of 
property markets. These models show that the importance of price capitalisation may be greater 
than previously recognized (see for example, the reviews by Batini and Ihori 2000, Coleman 
2008, Hilber 2017, or Sommer and Sullivan 2018.) In addition, there have been new empirical 
results examining how particular types of taxes are capitalised into property prices. This literature 
suggests there are some circumstances where taxes are strongly capitalised into property prices 
and some circumstances where they are not (Palmon and Smith 1998; Hilber and Turner 2014; 
Hilber 2017; Elinder and Persson 2017; .Hoj et al 2018.) It has further demonstrated that the 
                                                          




welfare implications of tax policy depend on the extent that taxes are capitalised into property 
prices and to ignore these effects raises the risks of making significant analytical mistakes. This 
issue has not been prominent in the earlier New Zealand reviews.  
The second new issue concerns the distribution of wealth and income. The increases in wealth 
and income inequality in most OECD countries have made it harder to ignore arguments that 
taxes on high capital or labour incomes or on wealth should be increased where they do not 
cause large efficiency losses (Brys et al 2016).   One of the most efficient ways to reduce wealth 
inequality is to raise taxes on property income. Because property ownership is highly unequal, 
and because property income is significantly under-taxed relative to other types of income, 
significant tax revenue can be raised from under-taxed wealthy people without efficiency losses. 
This allows taxes on other forms of income to be reduced. This argument is true irrespective of 
the extent that taxes are capitalised into property prices. To the extent that taxes are capitalised 
into property prices, the incidence of the new taxes will be shifted to current owners of property, 
reducing the extent that wealth inequality has been artificially increased by the tax system.  
Possible tax reforms (1) – the taxation of imputed rental income 
Imputed rent is the effective value of the rent that an owner-occupier obtains from living in their 
own house. This is not taxed in New Zealand, or in most other countries. If New Zealand 
wishes to tax income on an income basis the imputed rent earned by owner-occupiers should be 
taxed or else there is a tax incentive to invest in owner-occupied housing. To the extent that 
people respond to this incentive, it should generate demand pressures for larger houses and 
increase the price of property conveniently located to desirable amenities. Taxing imputed rent 
would correct these problems, and would reduce the price of residential property to the extent 
that the supply of property is not perfectly elastic. The revenue raised from these taxes would 
enable other taxes to be reduced. Coleman (2017) argues that the failure to tax imputed rent 
when other income is taxed on an income basis may be regressive not only because higher-
income working-age people are likely to own bigger houses and thus are getting larger tax 
concessions, but because it drives up the price of property and causes rents to be higher as well. 
Some countries such as Switzerland tax imputed rent. A majority of OECD countries do not. 
Following Kaldor (1955), most of these countries recognize that it is not necessary to tax 
imputed rent if a society also taxes other income on an expenditure basis. New Zealand and 
Australia are two of the small number of countries that are prepared to bear the adverse 
efficiency and distributional consequences of exempting imputed rent from tax when retirement 
savings are taxed on an income basis.  
Taxing imputed rent is ruled out by the Terms of Reference of the Tax Working Group. If 
imputed rent cannot be taxed, and other income is taxed on an income basis, a large distortion in 
the tax system will remain irrespective of what other policies are adopted. Since equity in owner-
occupied residential housing comprises over 40 percent of net household wealth, any attempt to 
correct other aspects of capital income taxation will necessarily be partial. It is difficult to see 
how a tax system that provides incentives to over-invest in residential property will not reduce 
the overall efficiency of the economy. It is also difficult to see how a tax system that engineers a 
transfer from young generations to the land-owning members of older generations by placing 
upward pressure on property prices will not be regressive.  
If the New Zealand policy makers are serious about improving the allocative efficiency of the tax 
system without taxing imputing rent, they should consider changing the way retirement savings 
are taxed income so that owner-occupied residential property is no longer tax advantaged relative 




countries and is likely to be compromising productivity aspirations by misallocating resources 
towards residential property investment.  
Possible tax reforms (2) – the taxation of interest income 
Additional details on this topic are contained in Appendix 4. 
Economists universally agree that the inflation component of nominal interest earnings is not 
income. For a lender, the inflation component of interest income compensates them for the loss 
of purchasing power of the sum they lend, because of generalised price increases. If the inflation 
component of interest income is taxed and the inflation rate is positive, the effective tax rate on 
real interest income is increased above the statutory rate. For a borrower, the inflation 
component of interest payments reduces real debt and thus it should be counted as savings. If a 
firm is allowed to deduct the inflation component of their interest payments from their taxable 
income, they pay less tax than they ought.  
The distortions that arise when the inflation component of interest income is taxed are 
substantial, even at low inflation rates. Each year, New Zealand households pay more tax than 
they should on $1,500 million interest earnings for every 1 percent inflation. Data limitations 
mean it is unclear how much the interest deduction is worth to business, but it is plausible that 
the deduction is larger than the interest paid by lenders as New Zealand entities borrow in excess 
of $200 billion from overseas lenders, and these lenders are only lightly taxed by the New 
Zealand government. Eliminating the ability to deduct the inflation component of interest 
earnings would reduce the tax deduction claimed by residential landlords by $600 million per 
year alone. Consequently, if the Government were to start taxing real interest rather than 
nominal interest, the fiscal cost might not be very great, and the reform could even be fiscally 
positive.  
If real interest income rather than nominal interest income were taxed there would likely be a 
reallocation of capital resources within the economy. There should be a reallocation of 
investment towards assets that are less amenable to debt financing, reducing investment in some 
business sectors and reducing the price of assets in those sectors.  There would be less incentive 
to purchase large houses or to pay artificially high prices for property.  
If real interest income rather than nominal interest income were taxed there would likely be a 
redistribution of income between lenders and borrowers that is equity enhancing, as lenders tend 
to be older and less sophisticated investors. These are not the only distributional considerations, 
however.  A full analysis of the effects of the policy needs to take into account any response of 
property prices to the tax regime. Since the current policy provides a subsidy to debt-financed 
residential landlords, and over-taxes some alternative investment opportunities, rent/price ratios 
should increase if the inflation component of interest income were exempt from tax. This 
change could take place as an increase in rents or a decrease in prices. If the supply of housing is 
relatively inelastic, exempting the inflation component of interest income from tax is likely to 
reduce house prices, whereas rents could increase if the supply of housing is relatively elastic 
(Coleman 2008). In either case, home-ownership rates are likely to increase. 
The main cost of exempting the inflation component of interest income from tax is an increase 
in the complexity of the tax system. It is not difficult to adjust interest earnings and payments on 
an ex-post basis. The larger difficulty is indexing the depreciation allowances claimed by business 
for inflation. Previous working groups have convinced themselves that these difficulties are 
sufficiently large that it is not worth the bother of properly indexing the tax system for inflation, 
a position that many find surprising given the modest compliance cost reported by Israel (Elkins 
2007). In its Interim Report, the current Tax Working Group reiterates these claims, although 




it is not possible to adjust the taxation of interest payments and receipts for inflation without 
adjusting the depreciation regime, which would be a straightforward exercise. It appears that the 
Tax Working Group is happy to tax lenders – often the least sophisticated and most risk averse 
investors – at above statutory rates so it long as it can provide a subsidy to investors who borrow 
to invest.  
On balance, it appears there are few good reasons for taxing the inflation component of interest 
income and receipts, except for administrative convenience. The policy is likely to lead to a 
misallocation of investment, an excessive use of debt-financing, higher property prices, and a 
redistribution of resources away from low-income young households and from unsophisticated 
investors. The revenue raised from this policy may not be large. The administrative difficulty of 
exempting the inflation component of interest income from tax may not be high. All in all, there 
is a strong prima-facie case for changing the tax basis of the tax system from nominal interest 
income and receipts to real interest income and receipts.  
Possible tax reforms (3) – capital gains taxes 
Standard tax theory suggests an income tax regime that does not have an accruals-based capital 
gains tax generates financial incentives that distort investment patterns by increasing the effective 
tax rate on investments that generate cash earnings early relative to those that generate cash 
earnings over much longer time frames (Samuelson 1964). In this light, the primary economic 
purpose of a capital gains tax is to correct some of the distortions caused by an income tax, just 
as a pollution tax corrects the incentive to produce too much pollution. Put more bluntly, the 
failure to tax capital gains on an accruals basis increases the distortionary effects of income taxes 
and creates incentives to invest too much in low-yielding long-horizon assets.  In an 
environment where property prices tend to increase, the prospect of large tax-free capital gains 
provides an incentive to bid up the price of property to artificially high levels.  
Capital gains taxes tend to be progressive, as capital gains are disproportionately earned by high-
income people. Since capital gains taxes are efficient and progressive, most OECD countries 
have a capital gains tax of one form or another.20 Typically the family home is exempt and 
nominal capital gains are taxed on a realisation basis at lower than normal rates out of 
recognition that some capital gains occur because of general inflation. Capital gains taxes are 
almost never levied on an accruals basis. Capital gains taxes are more complex to administer than 
most other taxes as detailed records of asset purchase and sale must be kept.  
Capital gains that occur because of generalised inflation are not income. With one exception, 
there is no good theoretical case for taxing the inflation component of capital gains. The 
exception occurs when society taxes the inflation component of interest income for in this case 
taxing the inflation component of capital gains equates the tax treatment of debt and equity 
claims. If the inflation component of capital gains is taxed for this reason, real income from debt 
and equity will both be taxed at effective rates that are higher than the statutory rates. While 
taxing the inflation component of capital gains in these circumstances will equate the taxes on 
both classes of assets, a better solution is to exempt the inflation component of capital gains and 
interest income from tax, on the basis that neither is income. If the inflation component of 
capital gains is taxed, real capital gains will be taxed at higher than statutory rates, reducing the 
incentives of people and firms to make productivity enhancing investments. A decision to tax 
nominal capital gains at full statutory rates in New Zealand, when capital income taxes are 
                                                          
20 The few exceptions include New Zealand and the Netherlands. Switzerland does not have federal capital gains 
taxes on shares or property, but there are canton-based capital gains taxes. South Korea does not have capital gains 




already very high by international standards, could be foolhardy, although consistent with New 
Zealand’s recent policy of taxing real interest income at above-statutory rates. 
It is useful to categorize the effects of capital gains taxes along two dimensions. The first is 
whether the taxes apply to residential property or other assets. The second is whether the capital 
gains stem from recurrent factors or non-recurrent factors. Recurrent capital gains are those that 
can be expected to occur in response to ongoing economic phenomena such as inflation, income 
growth, population growth. (They may also occur if firms reinvest rather than distribute their 
profits.) Non-recurrent capital gains occur when an asset is revalued for a non-recurring reason 
such as a change in interest rates or an increase in prices that raises the value of the output of a 
firm. The failure to tax recurring capital gains is likely to be more distortionary than the failure to 
tax non-recurrent capital gains, as they are more predictable and less likely to be reversed should 
interest rates or prices revert to their long run values. However, the failure to tax non-recurrent 
capital gains may raise significant equity issues as some people will be observed obtaining large 
increases in wealth on which they have paid few taxes.  
Since 2000 most capital gains in New Zealand have stemmed from the rising value of residential 
real estate, and the majority of these have enriched owner-occupiers rather than residential 
landlords. Between 2007 and 2016 the value of household wealth increased in New Zealand by a 
total of $252 billion in inflation adjusted (2016 dollar) terms, of which $138 billion reflects the 
increased value of owner-occupied housing, $71 billion reflects the increased value of rental 
housing, and $44 billion is associated with the increase in value of non-housing investments (see 
Table A2.2 in Appendix 2).21 On average, therefore, the real increase in the value of owner-
occupied housing averaged $15 billion per year, and the real increase of the value of assets 
(including rental property) averaged $12 billion per year. As some of the increase reflects real 
investment, revenue of around 1 percent of GDP per year would likely have been raised if real 
capital gains had been fully taxed. In Australia capital gains taxes raised a similar amount (Clark 
2014). Of course, if a capital gains tax were introduced and it deterred some speculation, less 
revenue would be raised as the prices of some assets would increase by less.   
The Terms of Reference for the Tax Working Group rule out the taxation of capital gains from 
owner-occupied housing. At first glance, the exemption of owner-occupied housing from capital 
gains taxes is consistent with the practice in most OECD countries. It is not, however. If New 
Zealand were to adopt a capital gains tax that exempted owner-occupied property, the economic 
effects would be different than those in most OECD countries as most of these countries also 
tax retirement savings on an expenditure (EET) basis. When retirement savings are taxed on an 
expenditure basis, it is not necessary to tax either the imputed rent or the capital gains associated 
with owner-occupied housing. For this reason, even though they exempt owner-occupied 
housing from capital gains taxes, most OECD countries tax owner-occupied housing and 
retirement savings on a consistent (expenditure) basis.22 
When retirement savings are taxed on an income basis, exempting owner-occupied housing from 
capital gains taxes is likely to reduce the overall effect of a capital gains tax on housing markets. 
The effect of a capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupiers on prices depends on the relative 
valuation placed on houses by landlords and owner-occupiers. If owner-occupiers tend to be the 
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between 2007 and 2016. Of this increase, $223 billion reflects the increased value of owner-occupied housing, $95 
billion reflects the increased value of rental housing, and $101 billion reflects the increased value of other 
investments. These figures do not take into account the effect of inflation or the net investment, although the latter 
is relatively small. 
22 Of course, the tax regimes of these OECD countries embody a different inconsistency: they tax housing and 




marginal purchasers of property (i.e. the people most likely to bid the highest price for a 
property) changing taxes on landlords without changing taxes on owner-occupiers is likely to 
raise rents without reducing housing prices. In contrast, if landlords tend to be the marginal 
purchasers of property, a capital gains tax will raise the rent/price ratio but whether this takes 
place as an increase of rents or a reduction in house prices depends on how much owner-
occupiers are willing to pay for houses. Landlords probably have been the marginal purchasers of 
lower priced real estate, for their share of the market steadily increased from 27 percent of total 
housing to 33 percent between 1998 and 2017.23 This means prices could fall if a capital gains tax 
were introduced, but they are unlikely to fall by much if the demand from owner-occupiers 
remains high. One reason demand would remain high is that property would remain a tax 
advantaged asset for owner-occupiers. Indeed some models suggest exempting owner-occupiers 
from capital gains tax could raise property prices by a small amount, as it reduces the advantages 
of renting and may expand the total demand for property.24  
If property prices were to change little once a capital gains tax were introduced, rents would need 
to rise (relative to the status quo) to make rental property an attractive investment. Since a capital 
gains tax that exempts owner-occupiers will not raise much revenue, it is likely to reduce welfare 
for a large number of low-income people (Coleman 2010).25 In contrast, a capital gains tax 
applied to all households is likely to raise large amounts of revenue that can be used to offset 
other taxes, and is more likely to reduce property prices. In this case low-income people could 
benefit despite the increase in rents because they could be compensated from the much higher 
revenues that would be obtained from taxing owner-occupiers, many of whom have high 
incomes as well as valuable, appreciating properties. When other assets are taxed on an income 
basis, a capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupiers has inferior welfare properties than a 
capital gains tax applied to all households, as low-income people will face higher rents but 
wealthy home-owners will not pay taxes on their capital gains. Given that much less revenue is 
likely to be raised, a capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupied housing provides less scope 
to reduce other distortionary taxes and so is unlikely to lead to large allocative efficiency or 
productivity gains. 
Even though a capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupied housing is likely to be much less 
efficient than one that includes owner-occupied housing, and even though it may be less 
progressive and may reduce the welfare of a large number of low-income people, a capital gains 
tax applied to all other assets including rental housing would have some benefits. It would 
correct the way the current tax systems favours low-yielding investments with long-horizon cash 
flows relative to high-yielding but short-horizon investments, particularly when these differences 
occur on a recurring basis. It would provide some revenue to reduce other distortionary taxes.  
Moreover, it may enhance public support for the tax system. When capital gains from rental 
property are not taxed and there are large non-recurrent increases in the value of these 
properties, many people consider that is unfair that the windfall gains made by these investors 
are not taxed while ordinary income is taxed.  
While residential real estate price increases have been the main source of capital gains in New 
Zealand in recent years, it is not clear what fraction are these capital gains were recurring rather 
than non-recurring. If the gains are temporary and non-recurring the government will not gain 
                                                          
23 Statistics New Zealand (2018) Dwelling and Household Estimates: December 2017 quarter. When these data are 
combined with Reserve Bank of New Zealand data on household balance sheets, it appears that the average value of 
a rental property is 65 – 70 percent of the average value of owner-occupied housing. 
24 This outcome could occur if young people reduce the time that they spend in shared accommodation because of 
an increase in the cost of renting. 
25 This result is an example of Lipsey and Lancaster’s (1956) theory of second best – that if there are two related 




much revenue over a whole economic cycle from taxing them. Moreover, if it introduces a 
capital gains tax at the top of an asset price cycle it risks losing considerable revenue.26 It is likely 
that much of New Zealand’s increase in asset prices during the last three decades has occurred 
because of the decline in international interest rates to record low levels, combined with the 
growing inelasticity of the housing supply (Dimson et al 2013).27 If interest rates increase from 
these low levels, some asset prices can be expected to fall, reducing the attractiveness of 
introducing a capital gains tax immediately.  
The absence of a capital gains tax is one of the ways that capital incomes are taxed differently in 
New Zealand than other countries. It is one of the three main reasons why capital incomes are 
taxed at such uneven rates in New Zealand, and it seems increasingly difficult to justify if New 
Zealand wishes to tax capital incomes from different sources equally. Like environmental taxes, 
capital gains taxes do not need to raise a lot of revenue to be successful. They are successful if 
they change behaviour and prevent costly distortions from occurring. If New Zealand once again 
experiences excess demand in its housing markets, perhaps because of supply constraints in land 
markets or because inward migration occurs at higher rates than new houses can be constructed, 
the lack of a comprehensive capital gains tax may artificially inflate house prices.  
On many occasions since 1990 the OECD has recommended that a capital gains tax should be 
seriously considered. The 2001 McLeod Review and the 2009 Tax Working Group both 
considered the introduction of a capital gains tax, and both rejected the idea on the basis of its 
administrative complexity. One thing that has changed since 2009 that suggests the issue should 
be revisited is the large and largely unanticipated additional increase in property prices. If, as 
theory suggests, the prospect of untaxed capital gains have contributed to the increase in house 
prices, the costs imposed on young New Zealanders and future generations of New Zealanders 
from not taxing real capital gains by adopting a comprehensive capital gains tax may have been 
underestimated.  
A capital gains tax that exempts owner-occupied housing provides only a partial correction to the 
distortionary aspects of the current tax regime, as it omits the largest and most lightly taxed class 
of capital assets. If taxes cannot be raised on owner-occupied property, a different type of 
solution may be necessary to solve the basic problem that New Zealand taxes different classes of 
assets at different rates. These solutions can be supplementary to a capital gains tax, or an 
alternative strategy can be adopted. One such strategy is to move towards taxing incomes on an 
expenditure basis, by taxing retirement savings when they are spent. This approach, which is the 
practice adopted in a large number of OECD countries, reduces the need to have a capital gains 
tax to correct the inefficiencies of income taxes. This issue is discussed in the next subsection. 
Possible tax reforms (4) - the taxation of retirement income accounts. 
Additional details on this topic are contained in Appendix 5. 
The previous subsections have discussed the problems that arise because New Zealand imposes 
direct taxes on an income basis while simultaneously taxing the inflation component of interest 
income but exempting imputed rent and capital gains from tax. While each of these problems 
could be fixed, many of the policies necessary to correct the flaws of the current income tax 
system have been ruled out by the Terms of Reference of the Tax Working Group. In any case, 
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flows are taxed at higher effective rates than assets that generate cash over longer horizons. If the capital gains are 
temporary and subsequently reversed the government does not earn much revenue, but it does transfer resources 
from those who made capital gains and those who made capital losses. 
27 This is not to deny a role for capital income taxes. When taxes are non-neutral they exacerbate the effects of 




it may be difficult to obtain sufficient community support for these reforms to make them 
politically sustainable. Fortunately there is another approach, one that taxes real interest returns 
and does not require a capital gains tax on owner-occupied property or taxes on imputed rent. 
This approach reduces the extent that owner-occupied residential property is tax advantaged by 
changing the taxation of dedicated retirement-savings schemes such as KiwiSaver so that they 
are taxed on an expenditure basis.  
Since Fisher (1937) and Kaldor (1955), it has been understood that it is possible to have 
progressive direct expenditure taxes by taxing income adjusted for the net purchase and sale of 
assets, on the basis that this total is close to a person’s expenditure on consumption goods and 
services. For example, if someone earns $50,000 and saves $5,000 in a retirement account, they 
would pay tax on $45,000, as the $5,000 contribution is saved and not spent. Conversely, if 
someone earns $20,000 and spends $55,000 after drawing $35,000 from a retirement-savings 
account, they would pay taxes on $55,000 in the year that the money was withdrawn and spent. 
In theory, all money that is saved could be deducted from taxable income in the year that it is 
saved, and taxed in the year that it is spent. In practice, this is administratively difficult, as all 
loans and asset purchases and sales would need to monitored, particularly as people have an 
incentive not to declare asset sales to the tax authorities. For this reason, a large number of 
OECD countries (including the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada but not Australia) 
have adopted a partial approach to direct expenditure taxes.28 All money deposited and 
withdrawn from sanctioned retirement-savings accounts (such as but not limited to KiwiSaver 
accounts) are taxed on an expenditure basis. Most other forms of saving, except for owner-
occupied housing and some specialised general purpose savings accounts, are taxed on an 
income basis.  
Retirement-savings accounts can be taxed on an expenditure basis in a variety of ways. The most 
common approach is to adopt an “Exempt-Exempt-Taxed” (EET) treatment. Income that is 
placed into a retirement account is exempt from tax when it is earned; the earnings of the 
account are exempt from tax when they accumulate; but the whole sum is taxed when it is 
withdrawn on the basis that it will be spent and it has never previously been taxed. An alternative 
approach is to adopt a “Taxed-Exempt-Exempt” (TEE) approach. In this case, which is 
considered a “prepayment” form of an expenditure tax, money is placed in a retirement-savings 
account out of tax-paid income, but no further tax is paid on interest or dividend earnings, or on 
capital gains. An EET treatment taxes the full return of any investment when it is withdrawn and 
spent, whereas above-normal returns are not taxed under a TEE treatment.29 In either case, 
income from all assets held in the retirement account are taxed identically so there is no tax 
incentive to hold one type of asset rather than another within these accounts.  
Owner-occupied housing is currently taxed in New Zealand on a TEE basis: a property is 
purchased out of after-tax income, or loans are repaid from after-tax income, but neither 
imputed rent nor capital gains are subsequently taxed. Consequently, if New Zealand were to tax 
funds placed in a special retirement-savings account on an expenditure basis, they would be 
                                                          
28 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States all have a version of an EET retirement income saving scheme. Hungary has an alternative form 
of an expenditure tax, a TEE scheme, which. Denmark, Italy, and Sweden have ETT schemes. New Zealand and 
Australia are the obvious outliers, and Australia provides some ‘concessions’ to the taxation of retirement income 
saving by having low taxes on employee contributions and low taxes on interest and dividend income. See 
Whitehouse (1999) or Yoo and de Serres (2004). 




treated in a similar fashion to owner-occupied housing.30 This would reduce the extent that 
owner-occupied housing is taxed less than other types of assets, so long as these assets were held 
within a sanctioned retirement-savings account. For people who hold most of their wealth 
except an owner-occupied home within a retirement-savings account, the distortions induced by 
the current tax system would be significantly reduced, particularly if people could change the 
contributions they make into a retirement-savings account at the margin.  
Since 1989, it has routinely been argued by New Zealand policy-makers that taxing retirement 
savings on an EET basis when other assets are taxed on a TEE basis will create a tax distortion 
by taxing different classes of assets differently. For instance, in its document “The Future of 
Tax” the Tax Working Group appears to dismiss arguments in favour of an EET tax system for 
retirement savings on the basis that the current approach “ensures that economic distortions to save in a 
retirement account instead of through other savings are minimised.”(p26).  This argument might be correct 
if all other assets were taxed equally.  However, they are not. Because income from owner-
occupied property is taxed on a TEE basis, because capital gains are not taxed, and because real 
interest income is over-taxed in an inflationary environment, it is not necessarily true that taxing 
retirement savings on a TTE basis will minimise economic distortions. Unfortunately, very little 
evidence has been presented in previous discussions to show that adopting an EET tax system 
for retirement savings would increase rather than reduce the unevenness with which different 
forms of capital income are taxed relative to New Zealand’s current tax system, and the 
proposition is not self-evident. Indeed, given the size of the owner-occupied residential property 
sector in New Zealand, and the other distortionary aspects of the current tax system, providing 
people with the option to hold assets in a retirement-savings account that is taxed on an EET 
basis could reduce the economic distortions that exist in New Zealand’s current system. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that no OECD countries have followed New Zealand’s lead and adopted a 
TTE tax system for retirement-savings accounts, and there has been little support for the idea in 
the international academic literature.  
Within an optimal tax framework, there are four key issues concerning the adoption of an 
expenditure basis for the taxation of retirement savings:  
 Would the reform enhance or diminish economic efficiency, by reducing or increasing overall 
tax distortions? 
 Would the reform change welfare, by changing the distribution of income and wealth, and by 
changing prices?  
 Would the reform affect tax revenue?  
 Would the system be complex to administer? 
Each of these topics is discussed in Appendix 5.  
The efficiency issue is most important from a productivity perspective. The main efficiency 
argument in favour of a TTE taxation regime is that it would mean that identical assets held 
within a retirement savings account or outside a retirement savings account would be taxed at 
the same rate. This is true, and it would be an important argument if all classes of assets were 
evenly taxed. When they are not, there can be advantages from allowing assets inside and outside 
retirement savings accounts to be taxed at different rates. For instance, interest earnings 
securities are currently at a tax disadvantage relative to equity securities, but this tax disadvantage 
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taxed on an EET basis, expected returns would be taxed the same, but actual returns would be taxed differently as 




does not exist inside an EET-taxed retirement-savings account. Similarly, the large tax 
advantages enjoyed by owner-occupied residential property would be reduced if other asset 
classes were taxed on an expenditure basis. Since agents have an incentive to hold the most 
heavily taxed classes of assets within a EET-taxed retirement-saving account, there is 
considerable scope for an EET taxed retirement-saving scheme to reduce the variation of tax 
rates across asset classes and thereby improve asset allocation and economic efficiency.  
It is also true that an EET regime for retirement savings schemes would reduce government tax 
revenue, and this revenue would need to be made up by imposing distortionary taxes elsewhere. 
But even this argument is not clear cut. The government obtains a lot of revenue from taxing 
retirement savings accounts on a TTE basis, but much of this revenue comes because the 
government imposes distortionary taxes on the return to savings. This is not just because the 
government taxes the inflation component of interest income (an issue that would be solved if 
interest-earning securities were taxed on an EET basis). It is true more generically because when 
the return to assets is taxed on an income basis, a wedge is created between the pre-tax and after-
tax return that distorts the decision to save (see Diamond 2011 for a statement of this argument 
in a New Zealand and Australian setting). To some extent, therefore, the additional revenue 
raised by New Zealand’s TTE taxation of retirement savings accounts arises because of the 
distortions the system imposes on the decisions to save and the excessive taxation of interest 
earning securities. The relevant question is whether the revenue raised by imposing these 
distortions could be raised at lower cost by imposing less distortionary taxes elsewhere. New 
Zealand’s answer to this question seems to be “No,” although it is not an answer shared around 
the world. Again, the answer is not self-evident. 
The efficiency costs of taxing retirement savings on a TTE basis might be justified if they helped 
achieved the Government’s welfare objectives. This justification for a TTE tax regime also has 
superficial plausibility, as the beneficiaries of the lower EET tax regime are disproportionately 
high-income individuals even though KiwiSaver membership is now widespread across people of 
all age groups and income levels. This argument is explicitly made in the Interim Report. 
However, the superficial plausibility of the argument may be incorrect, for two reasons. The first 
is simple: if the Government were interested in equity arguments, it could raise the top marginal 
tax rate, which is very low by international standards, to offset some of the benefit that high 
income earners would get from deferring the tax payments they make on savings placed in 
retirement income accounts. If this were done, the average marginal tax rate on high income 
earners need not change by much, because the higher marginal tax rate would not apply to 
income placed in a retirement savings account. The second reason is more subtle. Under an EET 
tax regime, owner-occupied housing and retirement savings are both taxed on an expenditure 
basis, providing households with a much smaller tax incentive to purchase real estate assets. If 
these incentives are capitalised into house prices, the main beneficiaries of a TTE tax regime for 
retirement savings will be the first generation of land owners (and their heirs), while low income 
renters and all future generations of young people wishing to purchase property will be 
disadvantaged by artificially high house prices. Coleman (2017) analysed this issue and argued 
that at current interest rates and inflation rates the regressive effects of a TTE tax treatment of 
retirement income savings could be substantial. Moreover, in line with the results of Feldstein 
(1977) and others, when the tax system artificially raises property prices, the intergenerational 
transfers tend to reduce capital accumulation in the economy, further undermining productivity 
performance.  
These three arguments all suggest the taxation of retirement-savings accounts on a TTE basis 
may not be achieving the hoped-for outcomes. It may be reducing allocative efficiency in the 
economy by encouraging over investment in real-estate assets and by reducing the incentive to 




earning securities in an inflationary environment. It means all investors face an artificial tax 
wedge between the pre-tax and after-tax returns to saving, which may discourage saving. It may 
be making the tax system more regressive, depending on how the tax advantages pertaining to 
owner-occupied property are capitalised in to property prices. These disadvantages are a high 
price to pay to raise revenue, one that very few other countries are willing to entertain.  
The above discussion has considered taxing retirement-savings accounts on an expenditure basis. 
There is no inherent reason why an expenditure tax treatment should be limited only to 
retirement savings account, however, and other countries offer savings accounts that are taxed 
on an expenditure basis. The United Kingdom, for example, allows residents to place up to 
£20,000 per year into Individual Savings Accounts that are taxed on a TEE basis that can be 
invested in cash, bonds, shares or even innovative financial products. The aim of such accounts 
is to reduce the distortionary effects of income taxes on savings and investment patterns 
wherever it is administratively simple to do so. Such an approach was extensively discussed in 
the 2010 Mirrlees Tax Review. 
The popularity of EET-taxed retirement-savings accounts in many other countries appears to 
reflect a judgement that income taxes have sufficiently bad effects on the allocation of capital 
that the additional revenues raised do not justify their adverse distortionary effects. For nearly 
thirty years, successive New Zealand governments and their advisors have come to a different 
set of judgments. It would be useful to understand whether the reasons for these differences 
primarily reflect differences in beliefs about the behaviour of the economy (e.g. the 
responsiveness of house prices to differences in the way housing and other assets are taxed) or 
differences in preferences over the distribution of income and consumption. If the government 
is concerned about the productivity performance of the economy, it would be useful to better 
understand the productivity consequences of taxing retirement-savings accounts on an income 
basis when the income tax system is applied so unevenly to different forms of capital income. 
The answer may not be encouraging. 
 
4. Tax, Productivity and Economic Growth 
Since New Zealand’s last major tax reforms in the 1980s, there has been a substantial change in 
the way economists analyse economic growth. Whereas much of the literature before 1990 
focussed on the ways a society’s rules and institutions affect participation in the labour force, the 
accumulation of capital equipment, and the development of skills, the new literature has 
focussed on the ways new technologies, production methods, and products are developed and 
diffused across an economy.  
A key feature of the economic growth process is that firms in any sector use a wide range of 
different technologies, have a wide range of productivity levels, and differ significantly in terms 
of their performance and profitability. There are typically a small number of very successful firms 
at the productivity and profitability frontier. These firms use the latest technologies, undertake a 
lot of innovative activity, operate in many countries, and are typically large. Behind them is a 
range of firms. In the middle are firms that, while less profitable, are copying and adopting the 
technologies that the lead firms use. After them are firms that are much less profitable and 
productive. These firms are often small, may have limited managerial capacity, or may be in 
business for reasons other than to maximise profits. Lastly there are new entrants, hoping to 
succeed, but unsure whether they have the correct mixture of talents to prosper. Some of these 
firms exit quickly. Others enter with new approaches and technologies and quickly become 




Economic growth rates depend on each of these four types of firms. Ultimately, the frontier 
defines the maximum productivity and profitability levels that can be obtained, and innovation at 
the frontier defines the ultimate speed at which an economy can expand. However, the speed by 
which these technologies diffuse to following firms also determines growth rates, for if high 
productivity practices are not widely copied average productivity levels will grow only slowly. 
The diffusion can take place in two ways: existing firms can make productivity enhancing 
investments to catch up with the frontier firms; or new firms with high levels of productivity can 
enter. Finally, average growth rates depend on how quickly low productivity firms exit. If a large 
number of low productivity firms survive, average growth rates will be reduced. 
Since 2000 a small literature has examined how different types of taxes affect the dynamic 
behaviour and growth of an economy. Broadly speaking, this literature has asked how different 
types of taxes (corporate taxes, personal taxes, consumption taxes and land taxes) affect 
economic growth rates, and whether they do so by affecting innovation, diffusion, or entry and 
exit rates. This literature has a different flavour than the earlier literature which analysed the ways 
output levels by changing participation rates or the accumulation of capital. 
The literature has attempted to measure the effect of tax changes on each of the four 
components of dynamic growth processes. Some studies have used variation in corporate taxes 
in Europe or in different U.S. states to analyse firms’ innovative activities or the speed at which 
firms converge to the productivity frontier. Other studies have analysed what happens when a 
country cuts corporate taxes but neighbouring countries do not. Still more have looked at the 
ways corporate taxes affect firm entry rates, foreign direct investment, or investment in new 
technologies. 
Overall, the literature has been remarkably consistent in its main finding: that high corporate 
taxes are bad for growth, and that significant improvements in growth rates may be possible if 
countries cut corporate tax rates (Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell 1999; Gemmel, Kneller and 
Sanz 2015). High corporate tax rates tend to reduce research and development activity, 
patenting, and the development of new products (Mukerjee et al 2017). They slow down the 
speed at which lagging firms catch up with the frontier firms (Arnold and Schwellnus 2008; 
Arnold et al 2011; Gemmell et al 2018; Bartolini 2018). They reduce entrepreneurship rates of 
entry, and rates of incorporation (Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Djankov et al 2010; Da Rin et al 
2011). They lower rates of investment by firms (Romer and Romer 2010; Djankov et al 2010, 
Bond and Xing 2015; Serrato 2018) discourage inward foreign direct investment (Desai, Foley, 
Hines 2004; Djankov et al 2010), and encourage investment in foreign countries (Serrato 2018).  
The effects are large in magnitude and generally statistically significant. Lee and Gordon (2005) 
estimate that a 10 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate is associated with a 0.6 
percentage point increase in growth rates. Gemmell et al (2018) analysed the effect of corporate 
tax changes across Europe and concluded that reducing corporate taxes by 10 percentage points 
could increase the speed at which firms converge to the productivity frontier by 0.4 – 0.9 
percent.31 Serrato (2018) demonstrated that a large increase in the effective tax rate on U.S. 
multinational firms resulted in large job losses as firms reduced their investment inside the U.S. 
and invested elsewhere in the world. Studies of individual countries such as Germany, Sweden or 
Estonia that have had large cuts in corporate tax rates also report higher levels of new 
investment and faster growth. 
Various mechanisms to explain these results have been proposed. One mechanism is linked to 
the disincentive effects of taxes – firms are less likely to innovate or undertake risky investments 
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when they pay high taxes as the rewards are reduced. Another mechanism recognizes that 
smaller firms often finance their investments by reinvesting their profits. High corporate taxes 
reduce the speed at which firms can make new investments by reducing their after-tax profits. 
These mechanisms affect different firms in different ways. Very low productivity firms make 
relatively low profits in any case and so are less affected by the disincentive effects of high taxes 
(Arnold et al 2011). Middle productivity firms are often smaller than frontier firms, and may be 
more affected by cash-flow considerations (Gemmell et al 2018). Bartoli (2018) also notes that 
the tax system can affect whether firms make investments in plant and equipment or undertake 
intangible investments such as research and development or marketing, as the latter investments 
are immediately deductible against profits but investments in plant and equipment are deducted 
according to a depreciation schedule. He argues this is a major reason why frontier firms pay 
lower taxes than less productive firms.  
High taxes on capital incomes may not only be bad for economic growth, but they may also 
reduce wages. Recent studies using large administrative datasets have refined estimates of the 
extent that that the incidence of corporate taxes falls on wage earners rather than the customers 
or owners of firms. Two high profile studies have used variation in corporate tax rates across 
U.S. states or German administrative taxes to study this issue. In their analysis of wages in 
Germany, Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2018) argue that 40 – 50 percent of the incidence of 
corporate taxes falls on wage earners as firm owners respond to higher taxes by reducing the 
wage increases their employees obtain. The effect is greatest on employees of local rather than 
multinational owned firms. Using U.S. data, Suarrez Serrato and Zidar (2016) make a similar 
sized estimate. In both cases some of the incidence of corporate taxes does fall on the owners of 
firms, but clearly a large fraction of the incidence of the tax falls on wage earners.  
Is New Zealand’s tax structure hurting economic growth? It is difficult to know for sure. There 
are no specific studies comparable to the recent international literature that examine how New 
Zealand’s corporate income taxes affect the growth of firms that systematically differ in terms of 
their productivity. According to the cross-county data compiled by Djankov et al (2010) to 
examine the relationship between taxes and economic outcomes around the world in 2004, New 
Zealand had high effective tax rates on businesses but also had very high levels of new business 
entry, high numbers of business per capita, and high inward foreign direct investment. 
Innovative activity does not seem to have been hampered by high tax levels according to this 
study.  
It has previously been shown that by world standards New Zealand raises a large amount of tax 
from businesses. Some of the proposals in the Tax Working Group Interim Report suggest taxes 
on capital and business income should be increased further, particularly by introducing a tax on 
nominal rather than real capital gains. The recent international evidence suggests high corporate 
taxes are a drag on innovation, technology diffusion and productivity convergence, and there is 
no obvious reason to discount this evidence or believe New Zealand an exception. If New 
Zealand wants to place a high priority on raising economic growth rates, this evidence suggests 
that it may be advantageous for New Zealand to reduce taxes on corporate and capital incomes, 
a position supported by the OECD (Brys et al 2016). New Zealand’s current tax structure means 
there is plenty of scope to reduce business and capital income taxes. New Zealand could shift the 
balance of taxes by adopting social security taxes on labour income like most OECD countries. 
It could adopt a version of the Nordic tax model. It could even consider introducing a 
compulsory retirement saving scheme funded from contributions on labour incomes, as 
Australia has done.32 These options will all result in a redistribution of the tax burden, although 
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all countries have managed to do this in a way that results in a progressive tax system. It is 
particularly noteworthy that the Scandinavian countries have followed this approach despite – 
and maybe because – of their reputation for highly redistributive social policies (Lindert 2004, 
chapter 10.) Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that New Zealand’s current approach to 
the taxation of capital income is leading to either optimal growth or welfare outcomes. 
Land Taxes, regional migration, and productivity.  
New Zealand, like most countries, allows free internal migration within its borders. When people 
migrate from one place to another they do so for a variety of reasons. Some migrate to obtain 
higher wages, more interesting jobs, or an education. Others migrate to follow friends or family. 
Some migrate to take advantage of attractive natural amenities, including a good climate, while 
still more migrate to cities with attractive consumption facilities such as opera houses or a 
buoyant night life. The combination of push and pull factors is probably unique for each 
individual.  
People weigh up the financial and non-financial benefits when they move to a new location. The 
non-financial benefits include the various natural and constructed amenities in the region. The 
financial benefits are the after-tax incomes, taking into account any differences in the cost of 
living, including housing costs. If a place has very high incomes, or very nice amenities, it will 
attract people placing upward pressure on housing prices. In equilibrium locations that offer high 
incomes or nice amenities will attract population until housing prices are sufficiently high that 
they deter newcomers. 
In recent years, there has been considerable concern in the United States that internal migration 
to highly productive places such as San Francisco or New York has been declining because 
building restrictions in these cities make housing prices artificially high and deter inward 
migration (Hsieh and Moretti 2015; Schleicher 2017). A similar argument concerns the effect of 
income and consumption taxes on migration (Albouy 2009). Consider someone who is 
contemplating moving to a location where they can earn $20,000 more before taxes, or a 
different location where wages are lower but the climate or natural amenities were better. 
Because income and consumption are taxed, the net financial benefits (before housing costs) of 
moving to the productive city might only be $12,000 whereas the benefits of the natural 
amenities are the same as they are not taxed. This increases the relative attractiveness of moving 
to places with good natural amenities rather than places that have highly productive firms and 
offer high incomes. In equilibrium, the movement to either location will be curbed by increasing 
housing prices. Albouy (2009) demonstrated that income and consumption taxes should alter the 
equilibrium, resulting in more people and higher prices than otherwise in places with desirable 
consumption amenities, and lower numbers of people and lower house prices than otherwise in 
highly productive regions. The size of the phenomena may be considerable; as a series of authors 
beginning with Graves has pointed out, large numbers of people in the United States migrate to 
regions with nice consumption amenities but relatively low wages (Graves 1980; Chen and 
Rosenthal 2008; Partridge 2010). In New Zealand sunny places have also been rising magnets for 
internal migration (Grimes et al 2016).  
It has been difficult to ascertain empirically the extent that income and consumption taxes deter 
migration to high-productivity, high-income locations, and no New Zealand studies have 
attempted it.33 (In New Zealand there has been far more interest in the way that land restrictions 
may deter migration to high-productivity, high-income locations.) However, there is no reason to 
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would be able to reduce income tax rates, enhancing economic growth rates. 
33 Nevertheless, Grimes et al (2016) has demonstrated that since the 1970s New Zealand’s population has grown 




doubt the claim that consumption and income taxes reduce the attractiveness of high income 
locations relative to location with desirable amenities. Fortunately, there is a way New Zealand’s 
tax structure can be changed to reduce the effect. The core issue is that the consumption 
benefits obtained from moving to highly productive cities are taxed, but the non-financial 
benefits obtained from moving to places with nice amenities are not taxed. Yet locations that are 
attractive for either reason have a symmetric effect on property prices. The solution, therefore, is 
to reduce income and consumption taxes, and impose urban land taxes. These taxes are neutral 
as to whether a place is desirable because it offers high incomes or desirable amenities, and 
therefore do not deter people from moving to high productivity places. 
Land taxes, which are currently applied by local governments rather than central governments, 
have a long history in New Zealand.  In 2013, land and property taxes raised $4.6 billion in 
revenue, of which 70 percent came from residential property and the rest came from commercial 
property. These taxes are levied on owner-occupied and rental property. Land taxes have been 
widely used in the past in other countries and were the dominant source of government income 
in the United States from the 1840s to the 1930s (Wallis 2000). 
Land taxes can be considered as an alternative tax to income tax. Their main advantages as a 
separate tax source is that they cause minimal distortions to economic behaviour, they can raise 
large amounts of revenue, and their incidence largely falls on people who own land when the tax 
is introduced, people who are typically relatively wealthy (Ricardo 1817; Oates and Schwab 
2009). From an optimal tax perspective, this makes them nearly perfect taxes.  Their main 
disadvantage is that they have proven difficult to sustain politically. One explanation for this 
difficulty is that a majority of voters own land in many countries, and they realise that they could 
raise the price of land if they were to reduce land taxes. Land taxes are most successful where 
governments have few alternative means of raising revenue, for voters are less likely to cut taxes 
if it means cutting necessary services. In New Zealand land and property taxes imposed by local 
governments have been easy to sustain for this reason. Similarly, land taxes were most successful 
in the United States in the years prior to the widespread introduction of income taxes.  
The incidence of the various taxes that affect the relative attractiveness of purchasing property 
was discussed in section 2. When the supply of land is relatively inelastic, the incidence falls on 
the owners of land when the taxes are first introduced. This, of course, is one reason why they 
are unpopular amongst existing land owners: they are likely to see the value of their assets 
decline. From an equity point of view, the rights of urban land owners would be of more 
concern if they were already paying an appropriate amount of tax on their residential property 
incomes. As has been previously demonstrated, they are not. In 2013, for instance, when local 
taxes on residential property raised approximately $3.2 billion dollars, the value of housing 
services in the economy was about $29 billion. This means the average tax rate on housing 
income was about 11 percent, a value that can be considered low relative to the statutory income 
tax rates.  
The Terms of Reference rule out applying additional land taxes to owner-occupied property. 
This rather negates the purpose of using land taxes. Coleman and Grimes (2010) used the 
Coleman (2008) model to explore the possible effects of different types of land taxes in New 
Zealand. They did not concentrate on the case that a land tax would only be applied to rental 
property, for the model suggested it would lead to a significant reduction in the size of the rental 
sector and little revenue would be raised. (The rental sector would shrink because it would 
become relatively cheaper to purchase owner-occupied property than to rent property for all 
who households that could raise a sufficiently large deposit.) In their examination of the effects 
of land taxes applied to all property, they showed the distributional consequences would depend 




land taxes would tend to lower property prices, reduce inequality, cause an intergenerational 
transfer from the first generation of property owners to all subsequent generations, and, in the 
long run, reduce the net foreign debt position of the economy. The main downside is the 
willingness of society to make such an intergenerational transfer. This is a political issue, but the 
willingness may be quite high given that the current tax system artificially inflates property prices 
and a land tax would merely be a means of reducing the extent that the current tax system 
imposes high costs on young people.  
What types of land should be taxed? One of the reasons why it is desirable to tax urban 
residential land is that the value of urban residential land is rarely due to improvements that 
landowners put in place. Rather, the price of urban land is the capitalised value of externalities 
adjusted for any tax liabilities, and most of the value of urban real estate is due to its proximity to 
desirable consumption amenities, workplaces, schools, or attractive neighbourhoods. In contrast, 
the value of rural real estate often reflects investments made by its owners to improve its 
productivity. A tax on urban land is unlikely to reduce the investments that make the land 
valuable, as these are not generally undertaken by the owner. In principle, it would not be 
difficult to introduce property taxes on urban residential land while exempting rural land from 
such taxes.  
Several recent academic studies, often with OECD-based authors, have contemplated the 
productivity consequences of different types of taxes (Johansson et al 2008; Arnold et al 2011; 
Brys et al 2016). They conclude that corporate taxes have the most adverse effects on 
productivity levels and growth rates, and recurrent land taxes are the least damaging. If New 
Zealand were to place a high priority on raising economic growth rates, one option would be to 
raise land taxes and use the revenues to reduce corporate taxes or income taxes. This would have 
a double benefit. First, it would reduce the current disincentive to move to high productivity 
locations rather than regions with favourable consumption amenities. Secondly, the reduction in 
corporate taxes is likely to stimulate growth rates. These taxes would also be easy to administer, 
since a basis for local government property taxes already exists.  
5. Conclusions 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, New Zealand reformed its tax system in many ways. A Goods and 
Services tax was introduced. Top marginal personal income tax and business tax rates were 
aligned and reduced. The taxation of retirement savings was moved to an income basis. A 
dividend imputation system was introduced. While many of these changes were lauded 
internationally, they left New Zealand with a tax system that differs in many respects from those 
in other OECD countries. With thirty years of hindsight, it is now difficult to be confident that 
these reforms left New Zealand with a tax system that is world class in terms of its ability to 
enhance productivity or even to achieve its welfare objectives.  
There are two big problems, and both concern the ways that capital incomes are taxed. One 
difficulty is the uneven taxation of capital incomes. The unwillingness to tax imputed rent or 
capital gains, and the excessive taxation of real interest income when there is inflation means that 
income from different classes of assets are taxed at very different rates. Owner-occupied 
property is highly taxed advantaged, whereas interest-earning securities are disadvantaged. This 
problem is much more acute in New Zealand than in many other countries because retirement 
savings accounts are taxed on an income basis rather than an expenditure basis. If New Zealand 
taxed imputed rent and capital gains, and if it taxed real rather than nominal interest income, it 
would make sense to tax retirement savings accounts on an income basis. If New Zealand 
adopted standard OECD practice and taxed retirement savings accounts on an expenditure 
basis, it would not matter so much that there is no capital gains tax on owner-occupied property, 




housing on a TEE expenditure basis while failing to tax other capital income on a consistent 
income basis is an experiment few other countries having been willing to risk. It is an experiment 
with little logical basis, unless the aim is to provide people with as many incentives to invest in 
owner-occupied residential real estate as possible, short of providing them with direct subsidies.34 
It should come as no surprise that New Zealand has had one of the largest increases if not the 
largest increase in real estate prices in the OECD since 1990, and the fastest increase in the size 
of newly constructed houses, although the tax system is only one of the contributing factors to 
these phenomena. 
The second issue is the size of business taxes, which are now high by OECD standards. There 
has been a noticeable movement around the world to reduce statutory and effective corporate 
tax rates since 1990. New Zealand has also reduced its corporate tax rates, but effective tax rates 
on businesses remain high. Modern evidence suggests that high corporate tax rates reduce 
investment, reduce research and innovation, reduce the speed at which less efficient firms make 
investments to copy frontier firms, and reduce economic growth rates. Several countries, 
particularly the Scandinavian countries, have responded to the detrimental effects of high 
corporate taxes by deliberately reducing taxes on capital incomes so that they are lower than 
taxes on labour incomes. Most other countries have lower taxes on capital incomes than labour 
income by imposing social security taxes on labour incomes. Either way, New Zealand’s 
attempts to tax labour, business, and other capital incomes (except incomes from owner-
occupied housing) at similar rates has little theoretical justification. The high taxes that 
businesses pay as a result may be reducing productivity levels and economic growth rates.  
High productivity levels, buoyant per capita incomes and fast economic growth are not the only 
or even the main objectives of tax policy. Taxes are designed to raise revenues to achieve 
particular welfare objectives, and it is appropriate for any country to impose distortionary taxes 
on its citizens to achieve those goals. However, modern theory and evidence is questioning 
whether the best way to achieve these goals is to impose taxes that are capitalised into property 
prices. There are now a large number of theoretical models, supported by a smaller but growing 
amount of empirical evidence, that tax policies which favour urban land ownership can 
artificially raise land prices and reduce the welfare of low-income and young households by 
engineering a resource transfer to older land-owning households. It is not clear how much this is 
a problem in New Zealand, but it would be surprising if this was not an important issue given 
the tax advantages enjoyed by the owners of urban property, particularly owner-occupiers but 
also landlords, and given the extent that house prices have increased since the tax changes of the 
late 1980s.  
There are several ways that some of these tax issues could be solved. In recent years the OECD 
has forcefully made the case that corporate taxes and personal income taxes should be reduced, 
and that these reductions could be funded by an increase in land taxes. This proposition has 
considerable appeal from a productivity perspective. It is also likely to redistribute resources to 
low income and young households if it reduces the extent that property prices are raised to 
artificially high levels due to their current tax advantaged position.  Higher land taxes may also 
reduce the extent the tax system discourages migration to high income locations in favour of 
locations with nice natural amenities, which would further enhance national productivity levels.  
The main disadvantage is the likely difficulty of getting social and political support for the 
introduction of land taxes because a majority of voters are landowners and may oppose measures 
to reduce the tax advantages they enjoy. It is worth noting that the introduction of land taxes on 
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owner-occupied housing is ruled out of the Terms of Reference of the Taxing Working Group, 
despite the likely productivity and equity advantages. 
If land taxes are ruled out, New Zealand could contemplate the introduction of much higher 
social security taxes in order to reduce corporate or capital income taxes.  Alternatively, it could 
contemplate the introduction of a compulsory retirement saving scheme as a way of reducing the 
taxes needed to fund New Zealand Superannuation in the future. This is standard practice in 
most OECD countries, and in fact the low level of social security taxes in New Zealand is the 
single biggest difference between New Zealand’s tax system and the tax systems of other OECD 
countries. Overseas experience suggests that such a transformation of the tax system need not be 
regressive. This proposition may appear radical given New Zealand’s past history, but in reality 
New Zealand’s current tax system is highly unusual and may be harming economic growth. 
A capital gains tax on real income is also likely to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, by 
reducing the incentive to invest in low-yielding long-horizon assets. New Zealand is unusual in 
not having a general-purpose capital gains tax. Nonetheless, a capital gains tax that exempts 
owner-occupied housing is likely to raise much less revenue than one which includes owner-
occupied housing, is likely to be more regressive if it leads to higher rents, and is likely to further 
increase the relative tax advantages of owner-occupied property. It is not enough to justify the 
exclusion of owner-occupied property from a capital gains tax on the basis of overseas practice, 
for this ignores the differences in the way retirement savings are taxed in New Zealand and other 
countries. When retirement savings accounts are taxed on an expenditure basis, as happens in 
most OECD countries, it makes sense to exempt owner-occupied housing from capital gains 
taxes. When they are taxed on an income basis, as is the New Zealand practice, it does not. Since 
the Terms of Reference of the Tax Working Group rule out the imposition of capital gains taxes 
on owner-occupied property, if the Government wishes to introduce a capital gains tax it should 
consider changing the way retirement savings accounts are taxed or otherwise risk the 
introduction of further incoherence into the tax system.  
One relatively minor reform concerns the way nominal interest income and payments are taxed. 
Taxing the inflation component of interest income, and allowing businesses that borrow to 
deduct from their taxable income the inflation component of their interest payments has been 
recognized by economists as a distortionary practice for almost a century. In a country like New 
Zealand where there is a large amount of foreign owned debt, the practice not only distorts 
saving decisions by raising the effective tax rates on real interest earnings but it subsidises 
businesses that borrow and raises little revenue. It may not even be revenue positive. The 
traditional rationale is that it is too difficult to adjust the tax system for inflation as depreciation 
allowances need to be adjusted as well. This justification seems stretched in a modern world 
where computing costs are tiny. This issue is likely to be more important to New Zealand than 
other countries for two reasons: New Zealand has unusually large overseas borrowings; and New 
Zealand citizens cannot shelter interest earning assets from excessive taxation by holding them in 
an EET-taxed retirement-savings account.  
It is sometimes argued that nominal capital gains should be taxed if nominal interest is taxed, on 
the basis that one distortion may be worse than two distortions. While the Lipsey-Lancaster 
theorem makes it clear that one distortion can be worse than two distortions, it is also clear that 
a case by case evaluation should be considered. Between 2008 and 2016 nominal capital gains 
excluding owner-occupied and leased residential property were three times as large as real capital 
gains, suggesting the introduction of a nominal rather than real capital gains tax would 
substantially increase taxes on business incomes above statutory rates. Given New Zealand’s 




important that a proper analysis of the effect of taxing nominal capital gains on economic 
activity and economic growth rates be undertaken.  
This document has not discussed more radical tax options such as the Hall-Rabushka (1985) flat 
tax proposal or the Bradford X tax scheme. Both of these schemes abolish direct income taxes in 
favour of direct, progressive consumption taxes. They have not been adopted overseas, but 
enjoy academic support. In combination with land taxes, they would represent a radical 
departure from the past, one which would significantly reduce the way the tax system adversely 
affects economic performance. They have not been discussed as most countries do not like the 
challenge of radical reform and New Zealand policy makers appear strongly committed to 
applying direct taxes on an income basis. Should New Zealand wish to shift towards an 
expenditure basis for direct taxation, perhaps by changing the way retirement savings accounts 
are taxed, these ideas would merit proper investigation.  
This paper has been silent about most aspects of tax policy other than capital taxation and it has 
not discussed the ways labour incomes can be taxed. At several places it has been suggested that 
labour income taxes or social security taxes could be raised relative to capital income taxes 
without unduly compromising productivity or welfare goals. Given New Zealand has low social 
security taxes and low marginal tax rates, this position reflects the international evidence that top 
marginal tax rates have little distortionary impact on participation decisions, particularly for full 
time workers. Overseas experience with social security taxes suggest the problems are far from 
insurmountable should there be a willingness to adopt higher social security taxes as a means of 
reducing capital income taxes. Nonetheless, previous attempts to raise the top marginal tax rate 
in New Zealand shows tax rates need to be raised carefully, as New Zealanders can easily use 
legal trusts to shelter income from tax when there is a large difference between tax rates on 
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Appendix 1. Capital and labour income taxation around the world. 
Labour income taxes 
The following table shows the average tax rate on labour incomes for different countries. The 
data, taken from OECD Tax policy database, shows the average personal income tax and social 
security contribution rates on gross labour income for someone on the average wage (Table I5).35 
The left hand side of the table includes social security contributions, including those made by 
employers; the right hand side excludes them. 
Table A1.1 International labour income taxes  
Country  Average tax 
Rate – mean 
income 
Rank  Country Average tax 
rate – mean 
income 
Rank 
Including social security contributions  Excluding Social Security contributions 
Chile 7.0 34  Chile 0.0 34 
New Zealand 18.1 33  Korea 6.1 33 
Mexico 20.4 32  Poland 7.2 32 
Switzerland 21.8 31  Japan 7.9 31 
Israel 22.1 30  Israel 9.7 30 
Korea 22.6 29  Mexico 9.8 29 
Ireland 27.2 28  Greece 10.0 28 
Australia 28.6 27  Slovak Republic 10.1 27 
Canada 30.9 26  Switzerland 10.7 26 
United Kingdom 30.9 25  Slovenia 11.6 25 
United States 31.7 24  Turkey 12.9 24 
Japan 32.6 23  Czech Republic 13.1 23 
Iceland 33.2 22  United Kingdom 14.0 22 
Poland 35.6 21  Austria 14.4 21 
Norway 35.9 20  Spain 14.7 20 
Denmark 36.3 19  France 14.8 19 
Luxembourg 36.7 18  Hungary 15.0 18 
Netherlands 37.5 17  Ireland 15.4 17 
Turkey 38.7 16  Canada 15.4 16 
Estonia 39.0 15  Portugal 16.5 15 
Spain 39.3 14  Luxembourg 16.7 14 
Greece 40.8 13  Estonia 16.8 13 
Portugal 41.4 12  Netherlands 17.3 12 
Slovak Republic 41.6 11  Sweden 18.0 11 
Sweden 42.9 10  New Zealand 18.1 10 
Finland 42.9 9  United States 18.4 9 
Slovenia 42.9 8  Germany 19.1 8 
Czech Republic 43.4 7  Norway 19.4 7 
Hungary 46.2 6  Finland 20.9 6 
Austria 47.4 5  Italy 21.7 5 
France 47.6 4  Australia 24.4 4 
Italy 47.7 3  Belgium 26.5 3 
Germany 49.7 2  Iceland 28.3 2 
Belgium 53.7 1  Denmark 36.1 1 
                                                          






Capital income taxes  
The OECD tax policy database presents tables of revenue raised from corporate taxes. Table 2 
shows the ranking for 2016. New Zealand is ranked as having the highest fraction of GDP raised 
from corporate taxes in the OECD.  




Turkey 1.4 35 
Slovenia 1.5 34 
Latvia 1.6 33 
Germany 1.7 32 
Hungary 1.8 31 
Poland 1.8 30 
Italy 2.0 29 
France 2.1 28 
Estonia 2.1 27 
Greece 2.2 26 
Finland 2.2 25 
United States 2.2 24 
Austria 2.3 23 
Iceland 2.4 22 
Spain 2.4 21 
United Kingdom 2.5 20 
Denmark 2.6 19 
Ireland 2.6 18 
Netherlands 2.7 17 
Sweden 3.0 16 
Israel 3.0 15 
Switzerland 3.0 14 
Portugal 3.1 13 
Canada 3.2 12 
Mexico 3.3 11 
Korea 3.3 10 
Belgium 3.3 9 
Czech Republic 3.6 8 
Slovak Republic 3.7 7 
Japan 3.8 6 
Australia 4.3 5 
Chile 4.3 4 
Luxembourg 4.4 3 
Norway 4.4 2 
New Zealand 4.6 1 
OECD - Average 2.8  
Source: https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV 





While New Zealand may raise the largest amount of taxes from corporate income in the OECD, 
this is not necessarily the best measure of the size of capital income taxes in an economy. Other 
measures include the statutory corporate tax rate, the effective tax rate on capital income taking 
into account depreciation schedules and other deductions, or the amount of taxes individuals pay 
on dividend paid by business to their owners. Table A1.3 shows a variety of different measures 
of taxes on capital incomes in New Zealand relative to those in other OECD countries. These 
measures are described below. 
Row 1: Statutory corporate rate  
Source: Hanappi (2018) Appendix B pp 51–59 from OECD sources. 
Row 2: Corporate tax take as a percentage of GDP  
Source: OECD: Category 1200 - Taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporates 
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV  
Row 3: Effective average tax rate on capital income (EATR) – equity  
Source: Hanappi (2018) Table 3, averaged over all categories of investment goods. These 
numbers are calculated assuming a 2 percent inflation rate and 5 percent real interest rate. 
Row 4: Effective average tax rate on capital income (EATR) – debt 
Source: Hanappi (2018) Table 6, averaged over all categories of investment goods. These 
numbers are calculated assuming a 2 percent inflation rate and 5 percent real interest rate. 
Row 5: Effective marginal tax rate on capital income (EMTR) – equity 
Source: Hanappi (2018) Table 4, averaged over all categories of investment goods. These 
numbers are calculated assuming a 2 percent inflation rate and 5 percent real interest rate. 
Row 6: Effective marginal tax rate on capital income (EMTR) – equity 
Source: Hanappi (2018) Table 4. These numbers are calculated assuming a 2 percent inflation 
rate and 5 percent real interest rate. 
Row 7: Effective tax rate on standardised small business, excluding social security and payroll contributions 
Source: Price-Waterhouse/ World Bank (2016) Paying Taxes 2016 (10th edition). 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes-2016/paying-taxes-2016.pdf  
Row 8: Effective tax rate on standardised small business, including social security and payroll contributions 
Source: Price-Waterhouse/ World Bank (2016) Paying Taxes 2016 (10th edition). 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes-2016/paying-taxes-2016.pdf  
Row 9: Marginal tax rate on distributed dividend income for high income earner 








Table A1. 3 Taxes on Capital income in New Zealand and the OECD 
  Average OECD rate OECD Ranking 
NZ All (36) Rich (20) Small (21) All (36) Rich (20) Small (21) 
       
1.Statutory Rate 
 
28% 25% 26% 23% 12 8 4 
2.Corporate tax take 
(% GDP)  
4.6% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 1 1 1 
3.Effective ATR 
(equity) 
28.1% 24.4% 25.4% 22.4% 13 9 5 
4.Effective ATR 
(debt) 
18.8% 16.6% 17.0% 15.2% 14 9 5 
5.Effective MTR 
(equity) 
27.5% 20.9% 23.1% 19.7% 9 6 3 
6.Effective MTR 
(R&D, equity) 
36.6% 21.0% 17.6% 17.0% 4 1 1 
7. Small business tax 
(ex social security) 
30.0% 15.9% 14.7% 13.5% 1 1 1 
8. Small business tax 
(inc social security) 
34.3% 41.2% 38.5% 38.5% 24 12 12 
9. High income 
dividend tax rate 
33.0% 41.3% 38.8% 37.2% 28 16 14 
Source: Author’s calculations from sources cited above.  
 
The table shows the tax rate in New Zealand, the average rate in three groups of OECD 
countries, and New Zealand’s rank within each of the groups (a rank of 1 means it has high 
taxes.) The three groups are:  
(i) all 36 OECD countries; 
(ii) the 20 rich OECD countries with average incomes at least as high as New Zealand; 















Appendix 2: The value of the capital stock and real estate in New Zealand  
The value of New Zealand real-estate and household wealth 
There is no single best way to compare the value of the residential property sector with the value 
of other assets. There are several measures that are relevant to a discussion of the role of tax in 
the economy. 
7. The separate value of debt and equity claims on owner-occupied and residential property, for 
the tax treatment of each of these claims is different. 
8. The total value residential property relative to the net-of-borrowing value of all business and 
housing assets owned by households, as this indicates the relative importance of the housing 
assets in the nation’s private sector wealth. 
9. The total value residential property relative to the value of all private sector business and 
housing assets in the country, as this indicates the relative importance of the housing assets 
relative to all of the assets in the country.  
The first two sets of measures are relatively straightforward to calculate in New Zealand using 
data on the household balance sheet compiled by Statistics New Zealand and the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. The last set of measures are more difficult to calculate as different conventions 
on the treatment of debt claims on business can be adopted when calculating the size of the 
business sector. Internationally, it is common to compare the value of housing with the value of 
net household wealth, and these calculations are reported here, but other methods are possible. 
However, making international comparisons is fraught with difficulty as some of the data are 
compiled differently in different countries. 
The data necessary to calculate the size of the residential property sector relative to net 
household wealth are available up to December 2017. The data necessary to compare the 
residential property sector with all private sector assets are only available up to March 2016. The 
following tables include data for both 2016 and 2017, plus earlier years to provide a comparison. 
In all but one case the tables are expressed in current dollar terms and not adjusted for inflation. 
Figure A.1 outlines the basic calculations, using data from the Annual Balance Sheet compiled by 
Statistics New Zealand for March 2016, supplemented by data provided by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand. (The raw data are in Table A2.2) Three issues should be noted. First, the value of 
assets owned by New Zealand residents is significantly less than the value of assets located in 
New Zealand.  For this reason the value of housing is a larger fraction of the value of household 
wealth than a fraction of the value of assets located in New Zealand. Secondly, the loan and debt 
statistics do not always record the sectors on which the claims are owing. This means it is 
necessary to add up the value of assets including the value of loans held by households and then 
subtract the value of debt owed by households rather than separately add up the total of debt 
and equity claims on different sectors. Thirdly, the value of business assets is based on Statistics 
New Zealand’s estimates of the value of the non-financial assets owned by business. It excludes 
the value of financial assets to avoid the way that financial intermediation inflates the value of the 
underlying assets in the economy.36   
                                                          
36 For example, if a business has assets worth $100m and borrows $40 million directly from households, the assets of the economy are the $100m business asset and 
the liabilities are a $40 debt claim and a $60m equity claim held by households. If the households deposit the money in a bank, which lends to the firm, gross business 
assets in the economy are the $100m business asset plus the $40m loan held on the bank’s books, and gross liabilities are the $60m equity claim held on the business 
plus the $40 million debt claim on the business held by the bank plus the $40m million claim on the bank held by the household. On most occasions it is useful to net 



































A. NZ claims on foreign 
assets  
$239,874 
B. NZ claims on NZ 
assets 
$1,297,554 
C. Foreign claims on NZ 
assets 
$399,236 
D. NZ-owned assets (A+B) 
(including government)                                                                           
$1,537,418  
E. Assets in NZ (B+C) 
(including government)              
$1,696,790 
 G. Net wealth of other NZ 
entities ( e.g. Government) 
 $225,673                              
F. Net household wealth 
                              
$1,311,745  
 
I. Owner-occupied housing 
(debt+ equity)                                                             
$ 680,123  
J. Rental housing    
(debt+ equity)                        
$228,329  
K. Other financial and business assets 
including loans to households  
$586,883                               
L. Subtract household debt  
(including mortgages against owner-occupied 
housing of $153,643)                                             
-$183,590  






Table A2.1 Claims against residential property in 2016   
  Owner-occupied Rental Total 
Equity $526,480 $166,579 $693,059 
Debt (mortgages) $153, 643 $61,750 $215,393 
Total $680,123 $228,329 $908,452 
 
In 2016, the total value of non-financial assets in New Zealand, whether owned by New Zealand 
private entities, the government, or foreign entities was $1,697 billion (Box E). The value of 
assets owned by New Zealand entities including the Government was $1,537 billion (Box D). 
The value of private assets held in New Zealand was $1,471,111 (Box H), and the value of net 
household wealth was $1,311 billion (Box F). The total value of housing assets including both 
owner-occupied and rental housing was $908 billion (boxes I and J). Consequently, the value of 
housing assets in New Zealand was 69% of net household wealth, 62% of private assets located 
in New Zealand including those owned by foreign entities, and 53% of the value of all assets in 
New Zealand.  
Table A2.2 provides a snapshot of New Zealand’s household balance sheets for March 2000, 
2007, 2016, and 2017. All data are in contemporary nominal prices, $millions. The data show that 
between 2000 and 2017 the value of residential housing had increased from 53 percent of net 
household wealth to 73 percent, with most of the increase occurring between 2000 and 2007. 
Using a different metric, between 2000 and 2017 the value of housing increased from 2.0 times 
GDP to 3.8 times GDP. During the same time the value of business assets actually decreased as 
a fraction of GDP, from 2.07 to 1.90.  
The value of assets held in superannuation funds increased decreased from 28 percent of GDP 
in 1999 to 19 percent of GDP in 2007, before steadily increasing back to 28 percent of GDP in 
2017 after KiwiSaver was introduced. The value of other investment funds slowly decreased 
throughout the period from 36 percent of GDP to 28 percent of GDP. These funds – and the 
value of business assets in general –   are now dwarfed by the value of housing in the economy.  
Table A2.3 indicates the size of the change in the nominal and real value of assets in the 
economy between 2007 and 2016. These are a proxy for nominal and real capital gains  - they are 
not an exact measure, as part of the change in the value of assets reflects new investment.37 
Between 2007 and 2016 net household wealth increased by $420 billion, of which $319 billion 
was associated with the increase in the value of real estate. In inflation adjusted 2016 dollar 
terms, the increase was $252 billion, of which $208 billion was associated with real estate assets. 
Real capital gains associated with other business assets were $42 billion. The capital gains from 
2000 to 2007 were even larger: in 2016 dollar terms, the value of real estate increased by $368 
billion, and net household wealth increased by $434 billion. 
 
 
                                                          
37 The total value of new residential construction between 2007 and 2016 was $60 billion, excluding the value of newly developed land. Approximately half of this 
construction is estimated to replace existing building. The total increase in the real value of housing over the period was $208 billion. This suggests capital gains 




Table A2.2 New Zealand Household Balance sheet, 1999 – 2017 (March years)  
  2000 2007 2016 2017 
Nominal GDP         1 113,228 172,112 254,704 270,265 
CPI Index  687 824 975 1000 
      
Housing and Land      
Owner-occupied 2a 181,920 455,096 677,039 770,947 
- Equity 2b 137,066 353,891 523,396 603,432 
- Debt  2c 44,854 101,205 153,643 167,515 
Rental properties        2d 47,080 131,461 228,329 259,998 
- Equity  2e 28,729 89,773 166,579 193,033 
- Debt 2f 18,301 41,688 61,750 66,965 
Total               2g 229,000 586,557 905,368 1,030,945 
      
Financial and Business assets owned by New Zealand households  
Total 3a 309,426 557,894 815,843 847,893 
- Currency and debt          3b 44,424 86,442 159,381 169,365 
- Superannuation               3c 31,530 31,919 69,136 76,732 
- Other investment funds   3d 40,403 53,045 71,089 74,556 
- Net rental                        3e 28,729 89,773 166,579 193,033 
- Other business assets      3f 162,290 296,735 349,658 334,207 
      
Household debt                         4 -55,231 -122,851 -183,590 -198,636 
      
Net Wealth                  5=2a+3a-4 436,115 890,140 1,309,292 1,420,203 
      
Assets located in New Zealand 
Total national assets 6a  1,182,180 1,696,285  
- Residential property       6b  586,557 905,368  
- Business (exc rental)       6c  448,407 574,339  
- Government/other          6d  147,216 217,078  
      
Net Foreign Assets                    7a -91,720 -129,757 -159,360 -152,972 
- NZ claims on foreign  7b 83,163 137,981 239,875 244,887 
- Foreign claims on NZ     7c 174,883 267,738 399,235 397,859 
Ratios      
Total Housing/ Net Wealth    2g/5 53% 66% 69% 73% 
Total Housing/ GDP              2g/1 2.02 3.41 3.55 3.81 
Business assets / GDP  (3c+d+f)/1 2.07 2.22 1.92 1.80 
Superannuation funds/ GDP    3c/1 28% 19% 27% 28% 
Notes: 
Author’s calculations from Reserve Bank of New Zealand household balance sheet data HC21 and HC22 and International Balance Sheet 
HM7 and Statistics New Zealand Annual Balance sheet.  
Section 2 - 5: RBNZ HC22. 2a – 2g from columns AF AL AN AO. 3a – 3f: 3a=B; 3b=C+D+G+K; 3c=X; 3d=R+U-X;3e = 2e;3f = 3a-3b-
3c-3d-3e; 4 = Z; 5=AM.  
Section 6 Statistics New Zealand Annual Balance Sheet. 6a = AH12;6b=2g;6c =  B12+D12-2d; 6d = X12+Z12+AB12+AD12. Business 
assets  






Table A2.3  Real and nominal capital gains, 2008 - 2016  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Sum 
Nominal value 
Owner-occ. housing 478 437 468 462 470 509 548 596 680  
Rental housing 138 131 141 143 151 163 176 195 225  
Total Housing 616 568 609 605 621 672 725 791 905  
Business (exc rental) 484 508 505 504 506 511 518 558 574  
Househld net wealth 913 848 905 933 947 1,019 1,076 1,178 1,312  
Nominal Capital Gains 
Owner-occ. housing 1 -41 31 -6 8 39 39 48 84 223 
Rental housing 8 -7 10 2 8 12 14 18 31 95 
Total Housing 29 -48 40 -3 15 51 53 67 114 319 
Business (exc rental) 36 24 -3 -1 2 5 7 40 17 126 
Househld net wealth 21 -65 58 27 15 71 58 101 134 420 
 
CPI 824 852 877 895 935 949 958 972 975  
Real Values 
Owner-occ. housing 549 488 512 484 485 520 552 599 680  
Rental housing 158 146 154 150 155 166 178 196 225  
Total Housing 708 634 666 634 640 686 730 794 905  
Business (exc rental) 556 567 552 528 522 522 521 560 574  
Househld net wealth 1,049 946 990 977 977 1,041 1,084 1,183 1,312  
Real Capital Gains  
Owner-occ. housing 7 -61 24 -28 1 35 32 47 81 138 
Rental housing 4 -12 8 -4 6 11 11 18 30 71 
Total Housing 11 -73 31 -32 7 46 44 65 111 208 
Business (exc rental) 23 11 -15 -25 -6 0 -1 39 14 42 
Househld net wealth -11 -103 44 -14 1 64 43 99 129 252 
Notes: 
Author’s calculations from Reserve Bank of New Zealand household balance sheet data HC21 and HC22 and International Balance Sheet 
HM7 and Statistics New Zealand Annual Balance sheet. See Table A1.1 for series definitions. Note that Business assets exclude rental 
housing and refer to business assets located in New Zealand, not business assets owned by New Zealanders. The capital gains on the net 
value of business assets (excluding rental property) owned by New Zealanders can be calculated as the difference between household net 






The large real capital gains experienced between 2000 and 2017 are probably not representative 
of the capital gains that can be expected in the future. The prices of many assets increase when 
interest rates fall, and this period was one when international interest rates declined to the lowest 
levels seen in a century. While asset prices increased in real terms in most OECD countries 
during the last century, real asset price increases of this magnitude are rare historically (Dimson 
et al 2013). 
Non-residential capital stock data 
An alternative approach to measuring the relative size of New Zealand’s capital stock is to 
compare the size of the private and public capital stocks with other countries. Table A2.4 shows 
the size of the private non-residential and the public capital stocks as a fraction of GDP for 29 
high income countries in 2013, using IMF data.38 In 2013, New Zealand’s private capital stock 
was 112 percent of GDP, 37 percent lower than average and the third lowest of the countries in 
the table. In contrast, New Zealand’s public capital stock was estimated at 60 percent of GDP, 8 
percent higher than average and the 8th highest in the table.  
International comparisons of housing wealth   
It is not straightforward to make a comparison with other countries as other countries present 
their household balance sheets differently. However, it appears that New Zealand has a relatively 
large fraction of its wealth held in housing assets – and a low fraction held as other assets. The 
following comparisons are with Australia, the United Kingdom, and various European countries.  
Australia 
In March 2017, residential land and housing was valued at $A6312 billion, or 64 percent of 
household wealth, compared to 73% in New Zealand. In 1999 and 2007, the ratios were 57% 
and 62%.39 The value of housing was 3.65 times GDP, compared to a ratio of 3.81 in New 
Zealand. The ratio of non-housing assets to GDP was 2.04, compared to 1.44 in New Zealand.  
United Kingdom  
In the year ending December 2016, the value of UK residential buildings owned by households 
was £1,521 billion, with an additional £3,866 billion in land. Non-financial corporations owned 
an additional £227 b worth of dwellings. If the land associated with these dwellings was valued in 
the same ratio as household land, the associated land value would be £576b. (Households plus 
non-financial corporations account for 98% of dwellings.) The total value of residential property 
can therefore be estimated at £6296b. This is 63 percent of the value of household net worth.40 
The ratio of directly held household property wealth/total wealth is 54% 
Other countries  
The quality of published data for other countries is uncertain. The OECD has published some 
cross-country tables calculating household wealth, but retirement savings are included in the 
tables in an inconsistent manner which devalues their approach. It was not possible to reconcile 
the OECD tables with the national data for Australia and the United Kingdom, for example: in 
the latter case non-housing assets worth close to 25 percent of household wealth were excluded 
from the calculation.  
                                                          
38 The data is sourced from the website https://data.world/imf/investment-and-capital-stock-i Series KGOV and 
KPRIV. 
39 Data from Australia Bureau of Statistics Table 5232.0 Australian National Accounts Table 34 Household Balance 
sheet, Current prices. Series A83728305F (housing value) A83722648X (net worth). 




In their publication “Household Wealth in Europe,” ING (2016) compiled data on household 
property wealth and household wealth for various European countries in 2015 (see Table A2.5). 
Most countries had ratios between 50 and 65 percent, and the Eurozone average was 59%. Spain 
and Slovakia were the two exceptions with ratios in excess of 75%. Their calculation methods are 
unknown, although their ratio for the United Kingdom is consistent with the data in the U.K. 
national accounts.  
New Zealand and international property price increases  
Table A2.6 presents information on average house prices and rents for New Zealand from 1923- 
2017 from a variety of Statistics New Zealand and Reserve Bank of New Zealand sources. From 
1923 – 1990, average real house price increases were 1.4% per year. Since 1990, the average 
increase in real house prices has been 4.2 % per year, with most of the increase taking place since 
2000. In contrast, average rents have scarcely changed since 1990.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas compiles property price data for 23 rich countries. Their 
database, the International House Price database, has data back to 1975. Table A2.7 shows house 
price increases between March 1990 and 2017. According to their methodology, New Zealand 
house prices increased by 234 percent in real terms over the period, the largest increase of any of 
the countries in the table.41  
The 1990 start date is chosen so the change in New Zealand property prices could be compared 
with the change in world property prices since the 1989 tax reforms. It should be stressed that 
New Zealand property prices were near a cyclical low in 1990. Over the whole period 1975 – 
2017 New Zealand house price increases were not as high as those in several other countries. 
Indeed, New Zealand had the third smallest property price increase between 1975 and 1990, in 
part because New Zealand house prices experienced a cyclical peak in 1975.  
 
  
                                                          
41 This increase is slightly higher than the increase calculated using Statistics New Zealand and Reserve Bank data. New Zealand would still have either the highest or 
second highest increase in the table if the New Zealand data were used. The International House Price Database is used to ensure consistency with the way the data 




Table A2.4 Private and public capital/output ratios in various IMF countries, 2013  
 Private capital 2013 Public capital 2013 Total capital 2013 
 % GDP Rank % GDP rank % GDP Rank 
Australia 183 3 40 24 224 8 
Austria 164 12 33 27 197 16 
Belgium 169 8 33 28 202 14 
Canada 148 15 51 14 199 15 
Denmark 163 13 43 22 206 12 
Finland 169 9 48 18 216 10 
France 137 21 51 15 188 18 
Germany 143 17 35 25 178 22 
Greece 167 10 54 13 221 9 
Hong Kong SAR 140 19 48 17 188 20 
Iceland 165 11 64 4 229 7 
Ireland 129 23 59 10 188 19 
Israel 138 20 27 29 165 25 
Italy 179 5 60 7 239 5 
Japan 156 14 107 1 263 1 
Korea 184 2 60 9 243 3 
Mexico 131 22 55 12 185 21 
Netherlands 128 24 50 16 178 23 
New Zealand 112 27 60 8 172 24 
Norway 146 16 45 20 190 17 
Portugal 181 4 56 11 237 6 
Singapore 189 1 69 2 257 2 
Spain 178 6 64 5 242 4 
Sweden 115 25 44 21 158 27 
Switzerland 171 7 40 23 211 11 
Taiwan  96 29 68 3 163 26 
Turkey 103 28 45 19 148 28 
United Kingdom 113 26 34 26 147 29 
United States 141 18 63 6 204 13 
Source: https://data.world/imf/investment-and-capital-stock-i Series KGOV and KPRIV 
 
Table A2.5 Residential Property/ wealth ratios in various European countries, 2015  
Country Residential property/ Net 
wealth ratio 
Country Residential property/ 
Net wealth ratio 
Austria 48% Italy 62% 
Belgium 54% Netherlands 50% 
Czech Republic 56% Poland 35% 
Denmark 48% Portugal 58% 
Finland 43% Slovakia 79% 
France 52% Slovenia 61% 
Germany 54% Spain 78% 
Greece 65% Sweden 31% 
Hungary 59% United Kingdom 55% 







Table A2.6 Annual average property price increases in New Zealand, 1923 – 2017  
 House prices 1923- 2017 
 Nominal increase Inflation Real increase 
1923:2 – 1963:2  3.7% 2.2% 1.5% 
1962:2 – 1990:2 11.1% 9.7% 1.3% 
1990:2 – 2017:4 6.2% 2.0% 4.2% 
    
1990:2 – 2000:1 4.3% 1.7% 2.5% 
2000:1 – 2017:4 7.3% 2.2% 5.1% 
 House prices and rents, 1975 – 2017 
 Nominal increase Inflation Real increase 
 1975:1-2000:1 
House prices 8.4% 8.0% 0.4% 
Rents 9.5% 8.0% 1.4% 
 1990:2 – 2017:4 
House prices 6.2% 2.0% 4.2% 
Rents 2.2% 2.0% 0.1% 
 2000:1- 2014:4 
House prices 7.3% 2.2% 5.1% 
Rents 2.2% 2.2% 0.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations from Reserve Bank and Statistics New Zealand data. See Coleman (2017) for a 
description of the series used for the pre 1960s data. 
Table A2.7 International property price increases 1990- 2017 
 Country  Percentage change  Country Percentage change  
Japan  -47% UK 109% 
S. Korea  -35% Canada 117% 
Italy  -11% Netherlands 125% 
Switzerland  0% Sweden 127% 
Germany  5% Belgium 128% 
Finland  20% Norway 143% 
Spain  25% Luxembourg 167% 
Croatia  28% Israel 168% 
US  45% Australia 181% 
S. Africa  53% Ireland 215% 
France  85% New Zealand 234% 
Denmark  103%   





Appendix 3. The tax advantages of residential property relative to other 
asset classes.  
This appendix considers the extent that residential property income is taxed less than other 
commonly held assets. It makes the comparison with income from directly held interest-earning 
securities such as bank accounts, and income from interest-earning and equity securities held in 
KiwiSaver and other retirement income accounts. These are the most commonly held classes of 
assets in New Zealand.  
New Zealand taxes nominal interest earnings. While the effective tax rate on nominal interest 
earnings is the standard income tax rate, the effective tax rate on real interest earnings is much 
higher than the statutory rate when the inflation rate is positive because the inflation component 
of nominal interest rates is taxed. This raises the effective tax rate on real interest payments by an 
amount (1 ) ( )i iπ π+ −  where i is the nominal interest rate and ̟ is the inflation rate. For 
instance, if the nominal interest rate were 4% and the inflation rate were 1.5%, this would 
increase the effective tax rate by more than 60 percent. For someone facing a 33% marginal tax 
rate, the effective rate on real interest income in this case would be 54%.  
Income earned in most KiwiSaver accounts is taxed either at a 28 percent rate or at the 
appropriate PIE rate, depending on the scheme. Nominal interest income and dividend income 
are both taxed at these rates. In general, capital gains from investments in New Zealand and 
Australian shares are not taxed, but the taxation of other capital gains depends on the exact 
structure of the fund. Thus real income from debt securities held in KiwiSaver accounts is taxed 
at rates higher than statutory rates, because the inflation component of income is taxed, while 
real income from equity securities held in KiwiSaver accounts is likely to be taxed at rates lower 
than statutory rates, because capital gains are not taxed.  
Table A2.1 indicates the major tax advantages of owner-occupied and rental property 
investments relative to interest-earning securities and KiwiSaver accounts. The extent of the tax 
advantage varies across the twelve possible comparisons, but in all but two cases (rental property 
investments versus equities held in KiwiSaver accounts) property is tax advantaged. These 
differences are discussed in detail below.  
Approximately half of all owner-occupied housing is owned debt free. The tax rate on income 
from debt-free owner-occupied housing is lower than the tax rates on income from either debt 
or on KiwiSaver assets. According to the Haig-Simon definition, the income from debt-free 
owner-occupied housing is the implicit rent earned from the ‘housing services’ generated by the 
property plus any change in the real value of the property. The change in the value of the 
property should include the effects of depreciation. Neither of these components are currently 
taxed.  Moreover, real income from interest-earning accounts are over-taxed in an inflationary 
environment. Consequently, income from owner-occupied property is taxed substantially less 
than income from interest earning securities, whether these are held directly or in KiwiSaver 
accounts.  Income from owner-occupied property is also taxed less than the income from equity 
securities held in KiwiSaver accounts, for while both are largely exempt from capital gains taxes, 









Table A3.1  The tax advantages of residential property relative to other investment 
classes  
 Interest-earning  securities 
 (directly held – 33%) 
Interest-earning securities 




Owner occupied housing 
(debt-free) 
-No tax on imputed rent 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income  
-No tax on imputed rent 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income  
-No tax on imputed rent 
 
 
Owner occupied housing 
(debt-financed) 
-No tax on imputed rent net 
of interest payments 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income  
-No tax on imputed rent net 
of interest payments 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income  
-No tax on imputed rent net 
of interest payments 
 
 
Rental housing  
(debt-free – 33%) 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income 
-No tax on capital gains 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income 
 
Rental housing  
(debt-financed-33%) 
-No tax on capital gains 
-inflation component of 
interest payments deductible 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income 
-No tax on capital gains 
-inflation component of 
interest payments deductible 
-Tax paid on inflation component 
of interest income 
 
-inflation component of 




A neutral tax regime for debt-financed owner-occupied housing is similar, except the owner of 
the property should be taxed on the imputed rent net of real interest payments, and the holder of 
the debt security should pay tax on the real interest payment. Since real interest payments are not 
deductible, debt-financed owners of owner-occupied property are less tax advantaged than debt-
free owners of owner-occupied property. Nonetheless, real capital gains are still tax exempt, and 
in circumstances where capital gains are large and expected to continue, debt-financed property 
is still likely to be tax advantaged relative to interest-earning securities. 
The tax situation for owner occupiers is complicated by local government property taxes.  In 
2013 local government rates totalled $4.6 billion, of which approximately 30 percent was paid by 
non-residential entities.42 As the value of residential property services was $29 billion, or 4.3 
percent of the estimated value of property, the average rate of local property taxes was 11 
percent of the value of residential property services.43 If these payments were a proxy for income 
tax payments, they would need to be counted when comparing the income tax paid on property 
income and other classes of capital income. These payments are not income taxes, however, just 
                                                          
42 Local Government New Zealand (2015) p19. 
43 The 2013 input-output tables produced by Statistics New Zealand record the value of residential property 
operation as $8472 million, and the value of owner-occupied housing services as $20,7175 million. The value of the 
housing and utility final consumption component of GDP for the year to March 2013 was $33198 (Infos series 
SNE036AA.) The value of residential property in March 2013 was $672 billion (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 




as tobacco taxes are not income taxes, and under the current tax regime they should not be 
treated as such, partly because the incidence of property taxes does not normally fall on those 
paying the tax.44,45 Consequently, they need not be counted when comparing taxes on different 
classes of capital income. Even if they were counted, income from owner-occupied property 
would still be taxed lower than normal rates, as the average local property tax rate is much lower 
than normal income tax rates.  
Taxes on rental property are less than they would be under a neutral tax system for two reasons. 
First, real capital gains and losses are not taxed. The treatment of capital gains and losses is 
particularly complex, for while depreciation allowances should be incorporated into the 
calculation of capital gains and losses, they are not. Consequently, neither capital gains nor losses 
are taxed appropriately. Secondly, investors who borrow can deduct nominal interest payments 
rather than real interest payments from their taxable income even though the inflation 
component of interest payments is properly treated as a real debt repayment. This factor is 
sizeable: in March 2017, mortgage debt held against rental property was $67 billion.46 When the 
inflation rate is one percent, this means the interest deduction that is claimed by residential 
landlords is approximately $700 million too large, a subsidy worth over $200 million.  
Investments in leased residential property are taxed lightly relative to interest-earning securities 
because real capital gains are not taxed, the inflation component of interest payments is 
deductible, and the inflation component of interest income is taxed. Investments in leased 
residential property are taxed lightly relative to equity investments held in KiwiSaver accounts 
because the inflation component of interest payments is tax deductible.  
To summarise, both owner-occupied and rental property are taxed less than the two most 
common alternative forms of investments, interest-earning securities and KiwiSaver accounts. 
Debt-free owner-occupied property is particularly tax advantaged relative to interest-earning 
securities but is also tax advantaged relative to equity securities as imputed rent is not taxed.  The 
tax advantage of debt-financed owner-occupied property is smaller, as mortgage payments are 
not deductible, but for households expecting to be debt free at some stage owner-occupied 
property is taxed at significantly lower rates than interest-earning securities. The tax advantages 
of rental property relative to interest-earning securities occur because capital gains are not taxed, 
and the inflation component of interest payments are incorrectly taxed. The advantage relative to 
equities held in KiwiSaver accounts primarily concerns the way residential landlords who borrow 
can deduct the inflation component of interest payments.  
  
                                                          
44 A government could use a property tax as a proxy for an income tax if it were difficult to tax the value of imputed rent directly. To do this they would need estimate 
the imputed value of rent conditional on the property value and then tax this sum at the householders’ individual income tax rate. 
45 Standard theory dating back to Ricardo (1817) argues that property taxes are partially capitalised into the value of the land and thus the incidence of the tax is 
different to an income tax. If land is supplied inelastically, the incidence of the tax falls on the owner of the property at the time the tax is introduced, although the 
incidence will partially fall on the contemporaneous occupants to the extent that the supply of land is elastic. See Hilber (2017) for a discussion of the conditions 
where a property tax will fall on the contemporaneous occupants of residential housing.   
46 This is calculated as the difference between all housing loan and housing loans borrowed by residential households, calculated from the Reserve Bank of New 




Appendix 4. The taxation of real interest income 
For nearly a century, economists have universally agreed that the inflation component of 
nominal interest earnings is not income (Viner 1923). For a lender, the inflation component of 
interest income compensates them for the loss of purchasing power of the sum they lend, 
because of generalised price increases. If the inflation component of interest income is taxed and 
the inflation rate is positive, the effective tax rate on real interest income is increased above the 
statutory rate. For a borrower, the inflation component of interest payments reduces real debt 
and thus it should be counted as savings. If a firm is allowed to deduct the inflation component 
of their interest payments from their taxable income, they pay less tax than they ought.  
These distortions are substantial, even at low inflation rates. In March 2016, New Zealand 
households held various types of interest-earning securities worth $156 billion.47 In that year 
New Zealand households paid tax on more than $1,500 million interest earnings for every 1 
percent inflation because the inflation component of interest earnings were taxed. Foreign 
entities interest-earning securities worth an additional $246 billion. The interest on these 
securities is only taxed lightly by the New Zealand Government, in the form of a small 
withholding tax levied on foreign lenders. The fraction of the interest paid on these securities 
that can be deducted from taxable income by firms is not precisely known. Households had 
liabilities of $184 billion in March 2016, but not all of the remaining $218 billion balance may 
have been deducted by firms. Nonetheless, because New Zealanders borrow so much from 
foreign entities, and because so little tax is collected from these entities, it is possible that the 
value of the business tax deductions exceeds the tax payments made by households and foreign 
entities. Eliminating the deduction of the inflation component of interest earnings would have 
reduced the tax deduction claimed by residential landlords on their $62 billion debt by $600 
million per year alone. For this reason, if the New Zealand Government were to start taxing real 
interest rather than nominal interest, the fiscal cost might not be very great, and the reform could 
even be fiscally positive.  
What would be the consequences of no longer taxing the inflation component of interest? There 
are five considerations. 
10. Capital resources might be reallocated within the economy, due to the reduction in the tax 
incentive to live in large houses or to pay artificially high prices for property. The reduction 
in the subsidy for debt-financed business may reduce investment in some business sectors 
and reduce the price of assets in those sectors. There may be a reallocation of investment 
towards assets that are less amenable to debt financing.48 
11. After-tax income would be redistributed away from the owners of debt-financed businesses 
towards lenders. Since domestic lenders are disproportionately older, less sophisticated 
investors, many people may consider that this will improve equity.  
12. Property prices are likely to decline and rent/price ratios should increase. Home-ownership 
rates are likely to increase, but the effect on welfare is ambiguous, depending on the supply 
elasticity of land (see paragraph A3.4). 
13. There will be a change in government revenue. This may be modest given the reduction of 
revenue from savers will be offset by an increase in revenue from debt-financed businesses.  
                                                          
47 The data in this paragraph are from Statistics New Zealand Annual balance sheet, March 2016, provisional, and Reserve Bank of New Zealand Household Balance 
Sheet HC22. 
48 There is an additional issue. Currently the depreciation allowances used to adjust income for tax purposes are not adjusted for inflation. This leads to an 
overstatement of taxable income when there is inflation, which offsets the understatement of taxable income for firms that borrow to invest. If the government 




14. There will be an increase in the complexity of the tax system. Most of the complexity occurs 
because the depreciation allowances claimed by business are not adjusted for inflation, and 
these adjustments are complicated. (Indeed, it is often argued that one of the attractions of 
taxing income on an expenditure basis rather than an income basis is the substantial 
reduction in compliance costs because investment expenses would be immediately deductible 
and would not be subject to incredibly complex deduction rules.). In contrast, Elkins (2007), 
based on the experiences of Israel, suggests that compliance costs may be modest. Since the 
government has already substantially simplified the process of claiming depreciation 
allowances in the residential property sector, this issue bears reinvestigation.  
Coleman (2008) used a sophisticated model to analyse the welfare implications of exempting the 
inflation component of interest income from tax in a New Zealand context. His model suggests 
that when the supply of housing is relatively inelastic exempting the inflation component of 
interest income from tax would reduce house prices and improve the welfare of most young 
households. Conversely, if the supply of land is very elastic, exempting the inflation component 
of interest income from tax would impose welfare costs on low-income households because 
rents would increase. In both cases the rent/price ratio should increase, as residential property 
investment has smaller tax advantages, and home-ownership rates would increase. In practice, 
since the supply of land does not appear to be very elastic, exempting the inflation component of 
interest income from tax is likely to be welfare reducing for younger, less wealthy households 
and welfare reducing for the generation of landlords affected by the policy change.  
Few countries around the world explicitly adjust interest income for the effects of inflation. 
However, the issue is more acute in New Zealand than in many other OECD countries, for 
many of these countries offer their citizens retirement-savings schemes that are taxed on an 
expenditure basis. As real interest income is taxed at the appropriate statutory rates when income 
from interest-earning securities is taxed on an EET basis, the tax advantage of owner-occupied 
property relative to interest-earning securities is less in these countries than it is in New Zealand.  
On balance, it appears there are few good reasons for taxing the inflation component of interest 
income and receipts, except for administrative convenience. The policy is likely to lead to higher 
property prices, a misallocation of investment patterns, an excessive use of debt-financing, and a 
redistribution of income from low-income young households and from unsophisticated 
investors. The revenue raised from this policy may not be large. If the administrative difficulty of 
exempting the inflation component of interest income from tax are not high, there is a strong 
prima-facie case for changing the tax basis of the tax system so that real interest income and 





Appendix 5. The taxation of Retirement Income Schemes 
Since 1989, New Zealand has taxed retirement savings on an income or TTE basis: income 
placed in dedicated retirement savings account is taxed (T) when it is earned, the earnings on the 
savings are taxed (T) when they are earned, and the resultant sum is exempt (E) from additional 
direct taxes when it is withdrawn. This practice is different from the practice in most OECD 
countries, where funds placed in a retirement savings account are taxed on an expenditure basis. 
In most countries these funds are taxed on an EET basis (the funds are exempt (E) from tax 
when they are earned, the earnings on the fund are exempt (E) from tax when they earned, but 
the whole sum is taxed (T) when it is withdrawn) but in some countries they are taxed on a TEE 
basis (the funds are taxed (T) when they are earned, the earnings on the fund are exempt (E) 
from tax when they earned, and withdrawals are exempt (E) from further taxation.  
Within an optimal tax framework, there are four key issues concerning the adoption of an 
expenditure basis for the taxation of retirement savings.  
15. Would the reform enhance or diminish economic efficiency, by reducing or increasing overall 
tax distortions? 
16. Would the reform change welfare, by changing the distribution of income and wealth, and by 
changing prices?  
17. Would the reform affect tax revenue?  
18. Would the system be complex to administer? 
The answers will depend on whether an EET or a TEE system for retirement-savings accounts 
is adopted. The following discussion assumes an EET system. Note that EET and TEE tax 
regimes both reduce the taxes that are paid on the returns to saving relative to a TTE regime. (In 
most countries, this is seen as an advantage as it is recognized that taxing the returns to savings 
when they accrue distorts the decision to save.) Moreover, subject to certain conditions, the end 
of period value of savings placed in a retirement-savings account would be the same whether the 
scheme was taxed on an EET or a TEE basis.49 Since capital income is not taxed under a TEE 
scheme, this suggests the effective tax rate on capital income earned in an EET-taxed retirement-
savings account is zero, although this is not completely accurate.50 
                                                          
49 If people invested the same pre-tax amounts and held the same combination of assets in retirement-savings 
scheme, and if the marginal tax rates did not vary over time, the end of period value of savings would be the same. 
This does not mean there are no differences between EET and TEE taxation schemes, however, as the tax is paid at 
different times. The government collects revenue at the beginning of the period under TEE taxation, and people 
hold fewer assets in their retirement savings schemes. Unless the government uses the tax revenue to hold the same 
portfolio of assets that private investors hold, or private investors increase their holdings outside of the retirement 
income scheme, the aggregate demand for assets is smaller under TEE taxation than EET taxation. 
50 There is a subtle issue here. Under EET taxation, tax is paid on the income placed in the account and on all 
capital income earned from the account, but not until the money is withdrawn. Under TEE taxation, tax is collected 
when the income placed in the account is first earned, and zero tax is paid on the capital income on the account. 
Even though the after-tax value of the account is the same at the end of the period when the money is withdrawn, 
different amounts of tax are paid to the government under the two schemes. The discounted value of the two 
amounts is the same if the discount rate is the average rate of return of the assets held in the retirement accounts. 
This rate is usually higher than the government bond rate. It follows that if the government bond rate is used to 
calculate the relative value of the tax payments under an EET and a TEE scheme, the discounted value of the tax 
payments under an EET scheme is higher than the discounted value of the payments under a TEE scheme. This difference is the 




The relative efficiency of EET and TEE taxation of retirement savings 
The efficiency arguments are complex. The most important effect of introducing an EET-taxed 
retirement-savings scheme would be to reduce the relative tax advantage of owner-occupied 
housing by providing people with an alternative class of investments that are taxed on 
expenditure basis. This is likely to be the biggest improvement in economic efficiency, because 
owner-occupied housing is the largest single class of assets. In a New Zealand context Coleman 
(2017) analysed the size of the tax advantage that owner-occupied housing has relative to 
interest-earning securities and showed that it could provide people with an incentive to live in 
houses that were 25 percent higher quality than they would under a neutral tax system. More 
significantly, the tax advantage of owner-occupied housing provides an incentive to bid up the 
marginal price of conveniently located property by 60 – 100 percent. In both cases these tax 
distortions would shrink if the income from other assets including interest-earning assets was 
taxed on an expenditure basis. 
Just because a tax system provides incentives for people to act in a certain manner does not 
mean that act in that manner. High labour taxes do not deter most males from full time work, 
for example, although they may influence where they work. Consequently, while the size of the 
tax distortion favouring owner-occupied housing is large when other assets are taxed on a TTE 
basis, the key question is ‘Do people change their housing demand in response to the way 
retirement savings are taxed?’ Unfortunately, there is little international evidence on this point, 
and the New Zealand evidence is not clear. Since New Zealand changed the taxation of 
retirement-savings scheme from an EET basis to a TTE basis in 1989, one way to assess the 
importance of the effect would be to see if there was a significant increase in the size of newly 
constructed houses or in the price of property after 1989 relative to other countries. There was: 
New Zealand experienced a faster increase in the size of newly constructed houses than either 
the United States or Australia (the only countries for which comparable data are available), and it 
had the fastest increase in real house prices of any of the 23 countries for which data are 
collected by the International House Price database produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas (Coleman 2017). However, as many other factors have changed in New Zealand since 
1989, it is not possible to untangle the role of the tax change and the role of other factors. 
Evidence that there were very large increases in the size of newly constructed houses after 1989 
and evidence that house prices increased extremely rapidly is not evidence that these increases 
were caused by changes to the tax system. Since the changes in the size of new houses and in 
house prices are in the predicted direction, they are obviously not evidence again the hypothesis 
that tax changes behaviour either.  
When empirical evidence on the importance of an effect is not available or decisive, theoretical 
principles must be used to guide analysis, with the qualification that the theoretical principles will 
be misleading if they omit important aspects of the issue. The theoretical principles are 
reasonably clear that if income from owner-occupied residential property is taxed at lower rates 
than other assets, there is likely to be an increase in the quality of houses and the price of 
residential property. There is very little theory that suggests that taxing owner-occupied housing 
less than other assets will have no effect or reduce property prices. Consequently, it seems likely 
that taxing retirement-savings schemes on an expenditure basis would reduce the size of the tax 
advantage enjoyed by owner-occupied housing and reduce the extent that this tax advantage 
results in artificially high property prices.  
Even though taxing retirement saving on an expenditure basis would reduce the distortion with 
respect to owner-occupied housing, it would mean income from assets held within retirement-
savings accounts would be taxed differently than income other assets. Is this likely to be 
distortionary, and if so would it offset the benefits that would come from taxing retirement 




some distortions, but these may not be particularly harmful. One of the advantages of taxing 
savings in a specialised retirement-savings account on an EET basis is that all assets within the 
account would be taxed equally, reducing the tax incentive to invest in one type of asset rather 
than another. This improvement comes at the cost of taxing similar assets at different rates 
depending on whether they were in or out of the retirement-savings account. In turn, this 
provides a tax incentive to hold some classes of assets inside a retirement account and some 
classes of assets outside a retirement account.  
The size of the tax advantage relative to a TTE regime depends on the class of assets being 
considered. The advantage is particularly high for interest-earning assets, which are over-taxed 
under the current TTE regime, and for equity instruments that earn income that is taxed at the 
full rate. In contrast, it is small for equity instruments whose earnings are dominated by capital 
gains, for these are taxed at low rates.51  
Most countries that offer an EET-taxed retirement-savings scheme provide limits on the 
amounts that can be placed in the scheme. Since income from all assets are taxed the same way 
within these schemes, but income from other assets is taxed at different rates, people using these 
schemes have an incentive to hold the most highly taxed assets within the scheme and hold other 
assets outside the scheme. In practice, this means people should hold interest-earning securities 
and assets which have relatively minor capital gains within a retirement-saving account and hold 
other assets outside the account. This portfolio reallocation may reduce rather than increase the 
dispersion of rates at which income from different classes of capital assets are taxed. If most 
assets taxed under a TTE regime were taxed at the statutory rate, taxing assets in a retirement 
savings account at lower rates would increase the dispersion of effective tax rates across assets. 
However, when the income from assets is taxed at all sorts of rates under a TTE regime, an EET 
retirement-savings tax regime can reduce the dispersion of tax rates particularly if people hold 
the most highly taxed securities in their retirement savings accounts. This could improve the 
efficiency of the tax system. New Zealand’s tax system currently provides an incentive to invest 
in assets that generate large capital gains even if the pre-tax returns are relatively low, and to 
avoid assets with high pre-tax returns if their returns are taxed at high rates. If people are 
provided with an option to hold the latter classes of assets in an EET-taxed retirement-savings 
scheme, is likely that investment in this class of assets would increase, improving average pre-tax 
returns. Unfortunately, this issue has yet to be comprehensively investigated, and definitive 
answers are unknown.  
This portfolio effect can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose 40% of capital incomes 
(owner-occupied housing) are taxed at 0%, 20% are taxed at 10%, 30% are taxed at 30%, and 
10% (interest earnings) are taxed at 50%. In this case the mean tax rate is 16% and the standard 
deviation of tax rates across different classes of assets is 87%. Further suppose that after an 
EET-taxed retirement saving scheme were adopted, the effective tax rate on the 10% most 
highly taxed assets was reduced to zero. The fraction of capital income in each tax class would 
change to 50%, 20%, 30%, and 0%, and the mean and the standard deviation would decline to 
11% and 57%. The standard deviation of the tax rates on the 60 percent of capital income 
initially taxed at positive rates also reduces in this case – suggesting that it is possible that an 
EET scheme would reduce the unevenness with which capital incomes are taxed even if owner-
occupied housing were excluded. In contrast, if all non-owner-occupied income were taxed at 
the same rate, the introduction of an EET system might increase the standard deviation of tax 
rates. If the initial distribution were (40%,0%,60%,0%) but this changed to (50%,0,50%,0) after 
                                                          
51 The Tax Working Group document “The Future of Tax” calculates the tax rates on different classes of assets (Figure 21 p40). Their results broadly support this 
contention. To some extent they understate the diversity of tax rates on different classes of assets by presenting the tax rates for assets in which the income is fully 
taxable rather than in the form of non-taxable capital gains. When most of the variation in tax rates across different asset classes occurs because of variation in the 





the adoption of an EET scheme, the mean tax rate would decline from 18% to 15% but the 
standard deviation would increase from 51% to 58%.  
A third tax distortion occurs because income taxes may affect the total quantity of savings, as 
well as the type of assets that people hold. This is because income taxes increase the effective tax 
rate measured in terms of deferred consumption opportunities, with the extent of the increase 
depending on the length of time that consumption is deferred.52 It is not clear the extent that 
people adjust the quantity of their savings, rather than the composition of their savings, in 
response to this distortion, but the balance of evidence suggests that the effect is small, and may 
be able to be ignored (see the review in Slemrod and Bakija 2017).  
To summarise, the adoption of an EET-taxed retirement-savings scheme would have mixed 
effects on the efficiency with which capital is allocated. It would likely improve efficiency by 
reducing the tax advantage enjoyed by owner-occupied housing over funds invested in 
retirement saving schemes. This will likely reduce the demand for housing and lead to lower land 
prices, although the extent that this adjustment would occur is not clear. An EET scheme 
provides a tax incentive for people to rearrange their investment portfolios, as similar assets 
would be taxed differently depending how they were held. This would reduce efficiency if all 
capital incomes were taxed in the same way in New Zealand, but since they are not it could 
improve overall efficiency as it should reduce the fraction of capital income that is taxed at very 
high rates. Overall, taxing retirement-savings accounts on an EET basis should reduce economic 
distortions on some dimensions while increasing them on others. As the theory of second best 
makes clear, partially reducing the distortions of a distortionary tax system may make things 
worse or may make things better (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). Consequently, it is difficult to 
know a priori how large the improvements – or reductions – in capital allocation efficiency are 
likely to be.  
Distributional issues 
How would adopting an EET-taxed retirement-savings scheme alter welfare? There are two 
main effects. First, since higher income people will disproportionately benefit from the reduction 
in effective tax rates on capital income, the tax change would have some regressive effects. The 
extent of these effects depends on the extent that lower income people currently pay the highest 
effective taxes on capital income because they disproportionately invest in interest-earning 
securities rather than assets that are lightly taxed. These distributional consequences could be 
partially undone by raising the top marginal tax rate, which is New Zealand is very low by 
international standards. Note that the taxes paid by high income earners need not rise 
appreciably from current levels if top marginal taxes were raised because not all income placed in 
retirement savings schemes would not be taxed immediately.  
Secondly, if property prices reduce because their tax advantages relative to other asset classes 
have reduced, there will be an improvement in the welfare of current and future generations of 
young people. This effect could dominate the direct tax effect if property prices are quite 
responsive to the tax environment, as they are in the economic models developed by Skinner 
(1996), Gervais (2002) or Coleman (2008). While there is little direct evidence about the size of 
this responsiveness, there is no reason to believe it is small. If the effect is large, reintroducing an 
EET-taxed retirement-savings scheme could lead to a significant improvement in the living 
standards of young people and future generations of New Zealanders by reducing the extent that 
property prices are artificially high. Coleman (2017) argues this effect could be substantial. 
                                                          
52 Consider $1000 invested at 3 percent pre-tax for 40 years. This would earn $2262 interest. If the tax rate were 0.33, net after-tax interest of $1516 would be earned 
under an expenditure tax regime, an implicit tax of 33 percent. If the interest earnings were taxed as they accumulated, only $1217 interest would be available to spend, 




Revenue costs  
What are the revenue cost of adopting an EET-taxed retirement-savings scheme? There is an 
immediate revenue cost, because tax is not collected on the income placed in a sanctioned 
retirement-savings account as it is earned. There is a second revenue cost, because tax is not 
collected on the interest and dividends paid into the accounts as they are earned. These two costs 
are offset by the taxes paid on the funds when they are withdrawn from the accounts. The 
present value of these sums depends on the types of assets held in the retirement-savings 
accounts, the taxes paid on these assets under the current tax regime, and the length of time the 
funds are invested. The more that assets in a retirement-savings account are invested in assets 
that earn higher returns than the risk-free rate, and the more the owners of these assets benefit 
from untaxed capital gains, the lower the cost of taxing the accounts on an EET basis.  
Consider the example of a person placing $1000 in a retirement saving account every year for 
forty years, and then withdrawing the funds evenly over a twenty-year period. If the funds were 
invested in risk-free assets earning 3 percent per annum and the inflation rate were zero, the 
present value of government revenues under an EET tax regime is 32 percent less than the 
revenue raised under the current TTE tax regime. If the inflation rate were 2 percent per annum, 
this fraction would increase to 42 percent because of the excessive taxation of real interest in an 
inflationary environment. However, if the funds were invested in fully taxed assets that earned a 
2 percent premium above interest earning securities, the present value of taxes paid under an 
EET tax regime would be only 20 percent less the taxes paid under a TTE regime. This amount 
reduces further to 13 percent if a third of the real returns earned by the fund stemmed from 
capital gains, which are currently untaxed. It is also possible that more tax would be paid under 
EET taxation than TTE taxation if the returns to the fund exceeded the risk-free rate by more 
than 2 percentage points, as they have done historically.53   
If the government taxed retirement savings on an EET basis, this example suggests the revenue 
loss for depend on four factors. The government would lose revenue if the assets in these 
accounts were interest-earning securities and inflation rates were positive, because real interest 
earnings are currently taxed at higher than statutory rates. The government would also lose 
revenue because capital earnings would no longer be taxed as they accrue. This means private 
savings would accumulate at the pre-tax rate of return, eliminating the way the current tax system 
distorts saving decisions by driving a wedge between wedge between the after-tax and pre-tax 
returns to saving. There is also a loss if the tax rate imposed when funds are withdrawn under an 
EET scheme is lower than the tax rate that would be paid when the funds are earned under a 
TEE regime. Conversely, there is a gain if the funds are invested in assets that earn more than 
the risk-free rate, for while the government does not collect tax when the contributions are first 
made into the retirement saving account, it collects tax on a much larger sum when the funds are 
withdrawn.54 There is also a gain if funds are invested in assets that earn real capital gains, for 
these are taxed under an EET scheme but not taxed under the current TTE regime. The first 
two revenue losses for the government occur because the distortions inherent in a TTE regime 
are eliminated. If the government decided to tax retirement-savings schemes on an EET basis, 
and needed to make up revenue, it would need to consider the relative magnitude of the 
                                                          
53 These calculations assume (i) The same real amount is invested each year for a 40 year period; (ii) the funds accumulate at the appropriate after-tax rate of return, 
adjusted for inflation; (iii) nominal capital gains are not taxed; (iv) For the first 40 years the fund is invested either in riskless interest-earning securities, risky securities 
earning an additional 2 percent, or risky securities  earning an additional 2 percent with of which one third comprises untaxed real capital  gains; (v) after 40 years the 
total sum is invested in interest-earning securities and paid out over a 20 year period in equal inflation-adjusted amounts. The revenue loss from EET taxation would 
be even less if the funds were withdrawn immediately after contributions ceased after 40 years. An alternative scenario was calculated in which the funds were paid out 
in year 41, which reduces the tax collected under the TTE scheme. Labour taxes are assumed to be 33 percent and taxes on capital are assumed to be 28 percent. 
54 This leads to an increase in the present value because the discount rate used to calculate the future value of the tax payments is normally the government risk free 
rate (the government cost of borrowing) not the higher rate of return to a diversified portfolio of assets. This increase in government revenues would not occur if the 




distortions it eliminates on saving and investment behaviour relative to the distortions that 
would occur from adjusting other taxes. 
In addition to a change in the net present value of tax, there is a significant difference in the 
timing of tax receipts. The delay in tax receipts under an EET scheme would mean the 
government would need to borrow in the early years of the transition, and maintain a higher level 
of debt in equilibrium. The change in the implicit net wealth of the government would be much 
smaller than the increase in its debt, as it would have an implicit asset equal to the tax owing on 
the accumulated funds in the retirement savings funds. The amounts could be considerable – for 
instance, Isaksen et al (2014) estimated that the implicit value of these tax assets exceeded 50 
percent of GDP in Denmark and the Netherlands in 2010. Currently the New Zealand 
Government has such a strong balance sheet that it is unlikely that this would be a serious 
constraint on the ability of the government to tax retirement savings accounts on an EET basis. 
It has not proved a barrier to the many other OECD countries that have adopted this taxation 
regime.   
Administration issues 
The fourth consideration concerns the administrative difficulty of taxing retirement savings on 
an expenditure basis. In the longer term, this would not seem to be a major issue: based on 
overseas experience, it would be administratively simple for New Zealand to tax savings placed 
in sanctioned retirement schemes such as KiwiSaver on an EET or a TEE basis. There are 
transitional issues, however.  
The transitional administration costs, the size of any revenue loss, and the size of any additional 
debt would depend on the exact nature of the retirement savings scheme. It is not obvious that a 
government would need to the change the taxation of all existing retirement-savings schemes, or 
even allow all people to take advantage of the new scheme. The scheme could be 
“grandchildrened” into existence, for example, by only allowing people born after a certain date 
to have access to retirement-savings schemes that were taxed on an expenditure basis. This 
would reduce the immediate fiscal cost of the scheme while ensuring the key distortion – the 
differential tax rate between owner-occupied housing and other capital assets – is reduced for 
those households who are yet to purchase housing. (It would also avoid the potential problem of 
older households adjusting their existing savings portfolios to take advantage of the less 
distortionary tax arrangements, without otherwise adjusting their behaviour.) If there were a 
date-of-birth eligibility criteria, the government would have to decide whether to only allow new 
contributions to retirement schemes to have different tax treatment, or whether to retrofit the 
scheme by placing additional funds in existing schemes, knowing that they would be repaid when 
the funds were withdrawn in the future. There is no obvious reason why such transition issues 
would prove difficult. 
